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A Positive Political Economic
Theory of Environmental
Federalization
Jason Scott Johnston†
Abstract
This Article sets out a positive theory that explains the late
twentieth-century federalization of American environmental law. On
this theory, federalization occurred not because states had failed to
regulate to reduce air and water pollution, but because older and
heavily developed states moving toward such regulation gained a
relative competitive advantage by imposing minimum standards on
less developed and less polluted states (in the case of air), and by
receiving subsidies from such regions (for water pollution reduction).
The failure of federalization in the case of climate change is directly
explained by this theory: the majority of states would be certain short
and medium term net losers from such legislation.
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Introduction
This Article sets out a positive theory that helps to explain the
federalization of environmental law and applies that theory to selected
episodes in the recent history of federal environmental law in the
United States. On my theory, federalization occurs not because the
activities of one State spillover and cause harm in other States. Nor
does federalization occur because States are failing to regulate to curb
harm from pollution because they fear losing industry. Instead,
federalization occurs when a large number of localities have reached a
stage of development where their citizens have a level of affluence and
leisure time that they demand a cleaner environment and reduced
pollution. Such citizens would support local pollution reduction
regulations, but federal pollution legislation can make them strictly
better off in two ways.
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One kind of federal environmental law that dominates local
controls, illustrated by the federal Clean Air Act,1 imposes uniform
emission reduction standards on all localities within the federation.2
As there is local demand within developed states and localities for
pollution control, federal environmental standards are supported by
local environmentalists and recreationists in such places. But,
crucially, as such laws provide economic protection against
competition for industry from lesser developed, less polluted states
and localities, the laws also are supported by local industry and labor
in the heavily polluted states and localities. There thus emerges a
coalition defined by both region and interest that successfully
supports the imposition of uniform federal environmental standards.
The second kind of federal law that can make citizens who
demand local pollution reduction strictly better off relative to local
regulation is one that directly subsidizes pollution reduction in highly
industrialized or rapidly industrializing locations. This type of law,
illustrated by the federal Clean Water Act,3 enjoys even broader
support, as it promises a subsidy both to places that are already
industrialized with a pollution problem and those that anticipate
rapid industrialization in the future.4 In the most straightforward
way, the law is paid for by people who reside in less industrialized
and polluted areas.
This theory explains a number of important facts about the
history of the Clean Air Act. It explains, directly, the imposition of
technology-based, facility-specific pollution control standards in less
developed, cleaner regions of the country (the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration or PSD program). Less directly, it can
explain the pattern of implementation of ostensibly uniform national
standards. The theory recasts the apparent failure of the Clean Air
Act to actually generate national uniformity in air quality not as a
problem, but as precisely what Congress intended in passing the law:
older and more heavily polluted areas were, on my theory, never
intended to be forced to incur the enormous costs achieving
unpolluted air.5 Finally, the theory explains the gradual but inevitable
loss of state authority under the Clean Air Act. Whatever discretion
might seem to have been given to the States by the Clean Air Act’s
regime of “cooperative federalism” to fine tune their environmental
1.

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006)).

2.

See infra Part III.B.1.

3.

Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006)).

4.

See infra Part III.A.

5.

See infra Part III.B.3.b.
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regulations in light of local costs and benefits of pollution control is
inconsistent with both the regional protectionist and national
preservationist objectives, both of which necessitate a drastic
curtailment of local regulatory authority to balance costs and benefits.
The first Part of this Article reviews the theory of environmental
federalization taken from the field of economics known as public
finance. This branch of economics has generated a normative theory
that shows how, under certain assumptions, regulatory
decentralization generates regulatory outcomes that make everyone in
a federation better off than under a system of uniform federal
regulation. The most important impact of this theory on public law
has been not in this result, however, but in the demonstration that
when various assumptions are violated, the case for regulatory
decentralization disappears or is greatly weakened. In this way, legal
scholars in particular have come to think of normative public finance
theory as generating not only a justification for the late twentieth
century federalization of American environmental law, but also a
positive theory that explains why federalization occurred.
By reviewing the stylized facts of late twentieth-century American
regional economic development and state and local air pollution
regulation, the second Part of this Article shows that as a positive
matter, federal environmental law did not arise because States were
failing to deal with the air pollution problem, but because wherever
there was a problem, the States were regulating. Together with the
historical fact that many regions of the country were very little
developed as of 1970, with no perception of an air pollution problem,
the history of effective state and local regulation suggests that an
alternative positive theory is required. The third Part of this Article
supplies such a theory with recent economic work showing how
federal minimum standards can arise as an equilibrium under majority
rule in a federal legislature. In such an equilibrium, the federal
minimum does not bind in the majority of jurisdictions (who are free
to regulate more stringently), but does bind in a minority of
jurisdictions. At the state level, federalization is counter-majoritarian,
in that it imposes the preferences of minority pro-environmental
voters in states whose median voter opposes the federal minimum
standard.
This model explains federal environmental law as arising from a
coalition among anti-development environmentalist advocates in
relatively undeveloped, unpolluted states and a broad-based set of
voters including both industry and labor in heavily developed,
polluted States. The final Part of this Article extends this same model
to explain an important failure to federalize: Congressional inaction
on federal climate change legislation. Unlike water and air pollution
circa 1970, there are no widely perceived short-term local
environmental benefits from a circa 2014 federal law that would
impose costs on or otherwise limit carbon dioxide emissions.
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Environmental benefits, if any, would be realized in the far distant
future, and would be primarily non-local. The demand for such
legislation is driven by Congressional representatives who are not just
environmentally liberal ideologically and Democrat by party affiliation
but, equally importantly, come from the minority of states that are
singular in that they rely exceptionally heavily on sources of power,
hydro and nuclear, that would be unaffected by a federal law
imposing costs on carbon dioxide emissions. Such federal legislation
would confer a potentially large relative competitive advantage on
such states. But this short term economic advantage would be offset
by the short term competitive disadvantage that federal carbon
dioxide emission controls would cause in the majority of states that
are much more reliant upon burning coal, or natural gas, for electric
power. The political economics of carbon dioxide emission controls
thus disfavors federalization of such controls.

I.

The Approach from Normative Public Finance
A. The Simple Economic Optimality of
Decentralized Environmental Regulation

The central economic justification for the decentralization of
environmental regulation is drawn from the field of public finance
economics known as the theory of fiscal federalism.6 That theory sets
out a “general normative framework for the assignment of functions
to different levels of government.”7 The foundation of that framework
is what has been aptly called8 the “matching principle”: the
“presumption that the provision of public services should be located
at the lowest level of government encompassing in a spatial sense, the
relevant benefits and costs.”9 This presumption is justified whenever
6.

For a very clear and comprehensive overview of this theory by one of its
founders, see Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37
J. Econ. Literature 1120 (1999).

7.

Id. at 1121.

8.

Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Using Federalism to
Improve Environmental Policy (1996).

9.

Oates, supra note 6, at 1122. For the original statements of this
principle, see Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (1972); see also
James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of
Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy
113 (1962); Mancur Olson Jr., The Principle of “Fiscal Equivalence”:
The Division of Responsibilities Among Different Levels of Government,
59 Am. Econ. Rev. 479, 486 (1969). For an alternative statement, see
Wallace E. Oates, Commentary, On Environmental Federalism, 83
Va. L. Rev. 1321, 1323 (1997) (“[S]ervices should be provided by the
smallest jurisdiction that encompasses the geographical expanse of the
benefits and costs associated with the service.”).
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the demand for and costs of local public goods varies across
jurisdictions. For then overall or global social welfare is higher when
decentralized jurisdictions offer varying levels of such goods than
when the national government provides a uniform level.10
An example will clarify how this theory works, and the
assumptions it depends upon. Suppose that the cleanup of a local lake
benefits only people who live in the jurisdiction where the lake is
located, and the costs are also borne entirely by local residents. Now
assume that local political representatives perfectly mirror the
preferences of their constituents, and (for simplicity) assume that
every local resident gets the same benefits and costs from cleanup.
Under these assumptions, any decision in the local legislature will be
unanimous, and that legislature will mandate cleanup if and only if
the local benefits of cleanup exceed the local costs. If the costs are
$100 but the benefits are only fifty dollars each distributed equally
over all local voters, then the legislature will not vote in favor of
cleanup. If the benefits are instead $150, then cleanup will occur.
Now suppose that we have a mix of three types of jurisdictions,
(which I’ll call states for concreteness) each completely homogeneous
across residents, each with a perfectly representative legislature and
each with a polluted lake. Now suppose that the cost of cleanup is
$100 in each of the three jurisdictions, but the benefit varies, twenty
dollars in First State, $110 in Second State, and $150 in Third State.
Clearly in simple cost-benefit terms, cleanup of the lake is only costbenefit justified in Second and Third States. Under decentralized,
local legislative control of the cleanup decision, cleanup will only
indeed occur in these States, just as basic economics dictates.
Continuing with this three-jurisdiction example, we see the
potential economic costs that regulatory centralization could impose.
For suppose that the cleanup decision must be uniform across our
three-state federation—that is, either all jurisdictions clean up their
lakes or none do—and suppose that the decision will be taken by
majority decision in a perfectly representative central (federal)
legislature. Under majority rule and with proportionate representation
in the federal legislature, the centralized majority decision will be to
cleanup all three lakes. Cleanup is cost-benefit justified in Second and
Third, but not in First State. The uniform, centralized majority rule
regulatory decision to clean up all the lakes leads to an economic loss
10.

Oates, supra note 6, at 1122. Perhaps the earliest demonstration of this
point is from Sam Peltzman and T. Nicolaus Tideman. See Sam
Peltzman & T. Nicolaus Tidemand, Local Versus National Pollution
Control: Note, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 959 (1972) (“[N]ationally uniform
pollution charges could only be optimal in the long run in a very
unusual world and particularly are not optimal in this world in the short
run (now), and further that a temporally efficient set of charges is more
likely to emerge under local rather than federal control.”).
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relative to the decision under decentralized control, where cleanup
occurs if and only if cost-benefit justified.
This example portrays the basic case for decentralization versus
centralization of environmental regulation. If costs and benefits vary
across jurisdictions so that the optimal level of environmental
regulation (which may include no regulation at all) varies across
jurisdictions, then decentralized, variable regulation may be superior
to a centrally determined uniform regulation.
B.

Complicating the Story, and Justifying Regulatory Centralization

This example hinges on a very large number of both explicit and
implicit assumptions. Violation of any one of a number of these can
complicate or even destroy the economic optimality of decentralized
environmental regulation and provide a justification for regulatory
centralization. Here are some of the most important complications.
1.

Failure to Internalize the Full Benefits of Pollution Reduction
(Interstate Externalities)

If pollution reduction or environmental cleanup (hereafter, I shall
refer simply to pollution reduction) benefits primarily people outside
the State that has regulatory authority over the environmental
regulatory decision, but the costs fall primarily locally, then the local
State will have too weak an incentive (from a federal point of view)
for pollution reduction. Its citizens may decide not to clean up the
lake, even though from a global point of view, total benefits (local and
non-local) exceed total costs.
Of course, the assumption that costs and benefits are entirely
borne by citizens of the jurisdiction with regulatory authority can also
be violated in the other direction. When the benefits of pollution
cleanup are local but the costs can be externalized outside the
jurisdiction, then local jurisdictions may have too great an incentive
to engage in environmental cleanup.
As a practical matter, the first of these two cases—where the
benefits of pollution reduction are externalized—has been the more
important. This first case in fact corresponds to the problem of
interstate externalities, where pollution from activities in one state
causes harm in another. When the costs of pollution reduction are
borne primarily in the polluting state, but significant benefits accrue
out of state, the polluting state will have too little incentive to reduce
its pollution. With such negative interstate externalities, decentralized
decision making standing alone will lead to economically suboptimal
pollution reduction.
We say standing alone because at least as a theoretical matter,
decentralization is not necessarily inconsistent with optimal pollution
control even with interstate externalities. Theoretically, if
jurisdictions could costlessly bargain with one another, then victim
states would have an incentive to pay polluter states to reduce their
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pollution. Anytime the benefits of pollution reduction are bigger than
the costs, a mutually beneficial deal to reduce pollution is at least in
theory possible.
As a practical matter, however, there are numerous impediments
to interstate bargaining to reduce pollution. Bargains among
American states—interstate compacts—are legally enforceable only
if authorized by Congress. Without such authorization, such deals
must be self-enforcing to be effective. Even with a framework for the
legal enforcement of interstate bargains, there remains the political
problem for any politician proposing to tax local citizens to raise the
funds to pay a neighboring jurisdiction to reduce its pollution. In the
United States, Congress can authorize interstate compacts, and it can
also pass federal pollution control legislation. Federal legislation
requiring an adjacent state to reduce its pollution shifts the costs of
pollution reduction to the polluting state, and it is hard to envision
circumstances in which a victim state politician is not better off when
the costs are borne by citizens of the polluting state than she would
be were she to propose that her own constituents increase their taxes
to pay the polluting state to reduce its pollution.
2.

Inter-jurisdictional Competition

The argument for decentralized environmental regulation hinges
on the intra-jurisdictional internalization of all costs and benefits of
pollution control. However, even if all the benefits and costs of
pollution reduction are internalized to a jurisdiction, any jurisdiction
is part of a larger world, and as part of larger political-economic
world, jurisdictions compete against one another. They compete for
both businesses—which bring jobs and tax revenues but possibly also
pollution—and for residents, who contribute tax revenues but also
generate their own costs, in the form of congestion of various local
public goods such as parks.
Of the two types of competition, economists have generally looked
upon the second type of competition—for residents—as a force
favoring strong (sometimes too strong) local environmental
protection. For local environmental quality, like parks, police, and fire
protection, is a local public good—something that all residents of a
jurisdiction are able to enjoy as a right of residency. Mobility of
residents across jurisdictions increases the benefits of decentralization.
If people sort themselves by choosing to live in jurisdictions that offer
their preferred tax—public goods packages, they impose competitive
pressure on local jurisdictions to provide high environmental quality
at a reasonable tax cost.11 As William Fischel has demonstrated and
11.

The conjecture that competition among jurisdictions will generate the
globally optimal provision of local public goods in a world where people
have heterogeneous tastes for public goods is known as the Tiebout
Hypothesis, after Charles Tiebout. E.g., Charles Tiebout, A Pure
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illustrated concretely, when residents are homeowners, their desire to
maximize the value of their homes creates a strong incentive to vote
for local governments that minimize the cost of providing high-quality
local public goods.12
The social welfare consequences of inter-jurisdictional competition
for businesses (mobile capital) are more complex. Indeed, such
competition has been called a “widespread and fundamental
challenge”13 to the economic case for regulatory decentralization. In
areas ranging far beyond environmental regulation (to include state
corporate law, welfare reform, and international tax policy), the “race
to the bottom story” has been put forward as justifying regulatory
centralization.14 It is relatively straightforward to show that if local
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956). The
Tiebout Hypothesis holds as a theoretical matter only if a large number
of things are true—such as subsidies between communities—so many, in
fact, that it is fair to say that the hypothesis is in general false. See
Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-Five
Years After Tiebout: A Perspective, in Local Provision of Public
Services: The Tiebout Model After Twenty-Five Years 17, 35
(George Zodrow ed., 1983) (identifying five problems with sustaining
efficient local public goods equilibrium). There is not much empirical
evidence supporting the assumption of preference heterogeneity that
underlies the Teibout hypothesis. See Daniel L. Millimet, Environmental
Federalism: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 64 Case Western
Res. L. Rev. 1669, 1699 (2014) (“In sum, the empirical evidence
regarding preference heterogeneity and its implications on environmental
federalism is limited and incomplete.”). However, the Tiebout model’s
implication that more heterogeneous resident preferences ought to result
in more decentralized policy-making has recently been confirmed. See
Koleman S. Strumpf & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Endogenous Policy
Decentralization: Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism,
110 J. Pol. Econ. 1 (2002) (finding state liquor policy is more likely to
be decentralized in states where voters have more extreme tastes).
12.

See William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis 39–71 (2001)
(applying the Tiebout hypothesis to the real estate market).

13.

Oates, supra note 6, at 1134–35.

14.

For example, Richard B. Stewart discusses the race-to-the-bottom
justification in the environmental area. See Richard B. Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196,
1211–19 (1977) (explaining four “structural factors” for centralized
environmental policy: the Tragedy of the Commons, disparities in
effective representation, spillovers, and moral ideals). John Douglas
Wilson precisely summarizes and explains the literature on the race-tothe-bottom in tax. See John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax
Competition, 52 Nat’l Tax J. 269 (1999). For a review of the literature
on how interjurisdictional competition for business constrains the ability
of jurisdictions to pursue redistributive welfare policies, see David E.
Wildasin, Factor Mobility and Redistributive Policy: Local and
International Perspectives, in Public Finance in a Changing World
151 (Peter Birch Sørenson ed., 1998).
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governments perfectly represent all the preferences of local residents,
then there will be no race-to-the-bottom. Governments will balance
off the local benefits of reduced pollution against local costs, including
the cost of jobs and taxes lost when tougher environmental standards
cause capital flight.15 Like many other results in theoretical public
finance, however, this result depends on a long list of assumptions.
These include assuming that: (1) all citizens of the jurisdiction are
homogeneous in how they benefit from and bear the cost of pollution
reduction; (2) all citizens work for the polluting industry; (3) labor is
immobile and in fixed supply; (4) capital is perfectly mobile and
competitively supplied; (5) pollution is regulated by a system of
pollution taxes with tax revenues returned to local citizens; and
(6) that each jurisdiction chooses the level of environmental
regulatory stringency that maximizes the utility of the median voter.
These assumptions ensure that all the costs and benefits of local
pollution control are internalized to the local jurisdictional decision
even when the jurisdictions compete against each other for mobile
capital. The theoretical literature supplies reasons to think that
decentralization itself may generate incentives so that some of the
assumptions—such as faithful political representation of local voter
preferences—may actually be realized. Such work has shown that
under decentralization, politicians may face a bigger electoral penalty
for diverting tax revenues to their own purposes,16 and face a higher
probability of being voted out of office for corruption more generally.17

15.

This basic point was made long ago by Richard O. Zerbe, Optimal
Environmental Jurisdictions, 4 Ecology L.Q. 193, 203–04 (1974).
Richard L. Revesz made the argument significant in public law
scholarship, See generally Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the Bottom” Rationale for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (1992).
The general demonstration that there may be no race-to-the-bottom
(the model that Revesz explains for lawyers) was developed by Wallace
E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among
Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. Pub.
Econ. 333 (1988). The basic idea underlying Oates and Schwab’s model
is that if jurisdictions internalize both the costs—lost taxes on mobile
capital—and benefits of tougher local environmental quality, then they
ought to set locally optimal environmental quality standards. Id. at 350.
Their result hinges upon many underlying assumptions: homogeneous
populations within jurisdictions, local taxes only on capital that are
returned to residents dollar for dollar for residents to use to purchase
private consumption goods, no non-environmental local public goods,
immobile labor, and the absence of any kind of jurisdictional market
power in the market for locations. Id. at 336–41.

16.

See, e.g., Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Political
Economics: Explaining Economic Policy 228–30 (2000) (concluding
that national elections weaken the link between good performance and
reappointment); Paul Seabright, Accountability and Decentralization in
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Still, violation of one or more of these assumptions can generate
forces that cause local environmental regulation to be either too lax or
too stringent. If, for example, some local citizens, including the
median voter, work in the polluting industry while others do not, then
local environmental standards may be too lax.18
3.

Scale Economies and the Possibility of
Non-Uniform Centralized Regulation

The economic case for decentralized environmental regulation
begins by assuming that the alternative to local environmental
standards that perfectly reflect the local costs and benefits of
pollution reduction are national (more generally, centralized)
standards that are uniform across jurisdictions and so completely
insensitive to variation in local benefits and costs. When centralized
standards can themselves be varied with local costs and benefits, the
case for centralization may become much stronger.19 Moreover, if
there are scale economies in regulation, so that regulatory costs fall as
Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model, 40 Eur. Econ. Rev. 61
(1996) (modeling the allocation of rights under incomplete contracts).
17.

Jean Hindriks & Ben Lockwood, Decentralization and Electoral
Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare, 25 Eur. J.
Pol. Econ. 385, 389 (2009).

18.

As is typical of general equilibrium models in public finance, all sorts of
results—including too much local environmental protection and too
little—are generated when different subsets of these assumptions are
relaxed. For an explication, see Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann, Fiscal
Policy and Environmental Welfare: Modelling Inter
jurisdictional Competition 89–112 (1998); Arik Levinson, A Note on
Environmental Federalism: Interpreting Some Contradictory Results, 33
J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 359, 362–65 (1997); John Douglas Wilson,
Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Is There a Theoretical
Basis for a Race to the Bottom?, in 1 Fair Trade and
Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade: Economic
Analysis 393, 405 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
The possibility that states might have overly lax environmental
regulations in order to attract capital and the jobs and revenues it
brings is really just a particular instance of the more general problem
that jurisdictions might undersupply costly local public goods in order
to keep taxes low. Again, virtually any result is possible depending upon
the model’s underlying assumptions. See Dietmar Wellisch, Theory
of Public Finance in a Federal State 58–87 (2000); David E.
Wildasin, Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition, 35 J. Pub.
Econ. 229, 237 (1988).

19.

Although, as the caveat indicates, this depends upon the political
economics of centralized standard setting—viz. with the way in which
central standards actually vary with local costs and benefits. Cf. Ben
Lockwood, Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization, 69 Rev.
Econ. Stud. 313, 324–25 (2002) (arguing that inefficient project choice
and not policy uniformity contributes to the costs of centralization).
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a centralized (but possibly locally tailored) standard is adopted in
place of independent regulatory decision making by local jurisdictions,
then the case for regulatory centralization becomes stronger still.20
C.

The (Inevitable) Failure of Normative Public Finance to Offer a
Positive Theory of Environmental Federalization

While it begins from a presumption in favor of regulatory
decentralization, the economic theory of fiscal federalism thus ends up
providing a theoretical justification for centralization as a corrective
for what seems to be inevitable state regulatory failure. In this, its
impact on environmental law scholarship has been all too great. From
the theoretical demonstration that interstate externalities and the
race-to-the-bottom may make decentralized environmental regulation
inefficient, generations of environmental law scholars have come to
routinely assume that state regulatory failure was the reason why
federal environmental regulation expanded so greatly during the late
twentieth century.21 Such scholars take it as a matter of faith that
federal legislation of the 1970–1980 Environmentalist era, such as the
Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act, were made necessary by the
failure of the states to do anything about pollution.22 The standard
story is that sometime around the first Earth Day in 1970, there was
a great awakening of American environmental consciousness, leading
20.

See Ben Lockwood, The Political Economy of Decentralization, in
Handbook of Fiscal Federalism 33 (Ehtisham Ahmad & Grigorio
Brosio eds., 2006).

21.

See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air
Act, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1183, 1221–22 (1995) [hereinafter Dwyer, Practice
of Federalism] (asserting that by 1970, the states had “done little to
address the worsening air pollution problem,” and “most states could
not be relied upon to establish an adequate environmental policy”).
John P. Dwyer argues that:
Even without interstate competition for business, states may
have been unreasonably biased against environmental
protection. State and local officials may have been unduly
sensitive . . . to the relatively concrete, immediate costs of
federal regulation and foregone development, and indifferent to
the value of the highly diffuse, amorphous, future benefits of
environmental regulation.
Id. at 1222 (footnote omitted); See also John P. Dwyer, The Role of
State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons from
Environmental Regulation, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203, 224
(1997) [hereinafter Dwyer, Lessons] (“Although they had two decades to
address the growing seriousness of environmental problems, states did
virtually nothing. Various failed efforts to get states to set and enforce
air and water pollution standards convinced federal policy makers in the
early 1970s that the only viable solution was federal regulation.”).

22.

See Dwyer, Lessons, supra note 21, at 224; Dwyer, Practice of
Federalism, supra note 21, at 1221–22.

1560

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·2014
A Positive Political Economic Theory of Environmental Federalization

to federal environmental regulation that led to something finally being
done about the pollution problem.
For the theoretical explanation for the presumed failure of State
regulation, environmental scholars typically look to the two stories
supplied by the theory of fiscal federalism: the “race to the bottom”
and interstate externalities. On the race-to-the-bottom story, federal
environmental legislation emerges as a solution to a nationally
disastrous competition among the states for mobile capital and the
jobs and taxes it brings. Hence, on that story, one ought to observe
the federal environmental regulation arose after States began to
weaken their environmental regulations in response to increased
interstate capital mobility. On the interstate externalities story, the
push for federal environmental regulation should have coincided with
an increasing awareness by voters of the extent to which pollution in
one state spilled over into other states, and with the failure of states
to cooperate via interstate compacts and other arrangements to do
anything about such spillovers.
When environmental law scholars have actually looked closely at
federal regulatory legislation, they been appalled by the divergence
between what public finance theory says should happen and what
Congress has actually done. In what remains perhaps the most
brilliant work on the political economy of federal environmental
regulation, Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler’s Clean Coal/Dirty
Air, the authors describe in considerable detail how a coalition
between environmentalists and Eastern coal industry interests
succeeded in amending the Clean Air Act in 1977 to require the use of
scrubber technology and high sulfur Eastern coal.23 This amendment
did little or nothing about the problem of sulfur-dioxide pollution that
it was ostensibly designed to solve.24 Committed to the social welfare
vision of federal environmental legislation as the solution to
externalities problems that the states either couldn’t or wouldn’t
address, Ackerman and Hassler spend most of Clean Coal/Dirty Air
developing an almost desperate ad hoc explanation for how Congress
could have gone so badly and terribly wrong. In the end, the most
striking thing about Clean Coal/Dirty Air is not its wonderful
description of the politics driving the 1977 sulfur-dioxide amendments,
but its revelation of the utter explanatory failure of the existing
public finance-inspired paradigm within which federal environmental
regulation has come to be understood.

23.

Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty
Air: Or How the Clean Air Became a Multibillion-Dollar
Bail-Out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should
Be Done About It 36–38, 55–56 (1981).

24.

Id. at 59–78.
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Over the last several decades, there has been growing awareness
of both the theoretical problems with the existing public financeinspired account for federal environmental regulation25 and of the
striking divorce between the theoretical objective behind federal
environmental law and what it has actually accomplished.26 Whatever
its value as a general normative guide, the theory of optimal
regulatory decentralization has failed as a positive theory explaining
American environmental regulatory centralization.

II. Setting the Stage: American Development and the
Demand for Environmental Improvement, Circa 1970
The great wave of federal environmental legislation passed during
the 1970s brought very concrete and sizeable benefits to certain
clearly identified States and regions.27 The basic structure of a federal
25.

There are two strands in the literature. Very early on, law and
economics critics pointed out that the basic lesson from the economic
theory of fiscal federalism was not the decentralization did not work,
but that it was presumptively superior given heterogeneous jurisdictions.
See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1355–59 (1985); James E.
Krier, Commentary, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards:
Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 323, 324–35 (1974). As
is typical of general equilibrium models in public finance, all sorts of
results—including too much local environmental protection and too
little—are generated when different subsets of these assumptions are
relaxed. See Bayindir-Upmann, supra note 18; Levinson, supra note
18, at 359–60; Wilson, supra note 18, at 405. The possibility that States
might have overly lax environmental regulations in order to attract
capital and the jobs and revenues it brings is really just a particular
instance of the more general problem that jurisdictions might
undersupply costly local public goods in order to keep taxes low. Again,
virtually any result is possible depending upon the model’s underlying
assumptions. See Wildasin, supra note 18, at 237; Wellisch, supra note
18, at 58–87.

26.

As observed by Jonathan H. Adler, and as detailed below, perhaps the
greatest disjunction between the public finance theory and legislative
reality is that the federal environmental laws addressed almost entirely
local, rather than interstate problems. Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional
Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 130
(2005). The 1970 Clean Air Act did not address interstate air pollution,
and although the 1977 Act did, the provisions it contained were weak
and proved ineffective. Dwyer, Practice of Federalism, supra note 21, at
1220. For one of the most powerful critique of the Clean Air Act’s
failure to effectively regulate interstate air pollution, see Richard L.
Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 2341, 2346 (1996) (arguing that rather than regulating air
pollution, the Clean Air Act’s inability to control interstate externalities
may have exacerbated air pollution).

27.

What remains the classic public choice analysis of how such geographic
redistribution motivated federal environmental laws is B. Peter
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legislature whose members represent geographic (rather than
functional or industry) voting units makes it exceptionally responsive
to such geographically targeted benefits.28 Federal environmental
legislation arose when and because the relatively concentrated costs of
economic development in older, more heavily developed parts of the
country created overwhelming support for environmental cleanup
there and for the preservation of relatively pristine, undeveloped
natural environments in newer, less heavily developed parts of the
country. Its success was neither puzzling nor paradoxical, but rather
the logically inevitable result of the political incentives for
federalization created by regionally divergent paths of economic
development and environmental degradation.
On this theory, rather than solving a problem of too much
competition among the states for mobile capital, or uncontrolled
interstate externalities, environmental centralization occurs in order
to prevent capital from moving to the relatively clean air and water,
and cheap land and labor found in relatively undeveloped regions of
the country. Rather than stopping locally undesirable interstate
regulatory competition, federal environmental laws prevent locally
beneficial interstate economic competition. Likewise, whereas the
interstate externality story centers on physical spillovers of pollution
across state borders, my account clarifies that whether there are
physical externalities or not is really irrelevant.
This theory explains both successful and failed attempts at
environmental federalization. In the case of the Clean Air Act,
representatives of older and more industrialized states supported
federal minimum pollution reduction standards because they believed
that those standards were necessary to enable their states to reduce
pollution without losing too many factories to newer, less polluted
parts of the country. Such centralized minimum environmental
standards are a form of economic protectionism, and are locally
Pashigian’s study of the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant
Deterioration Program. See B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental
Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?, 23 Econ.
Inquiry 551 (1985) (discussing the self-interest hypothesis and other
hypotheses to explain votes on the PSD policy). I discuss the
distributional politics of the PSD program infra text at notes 237–238.
28.

Work in empirical political science that has looked at legislative role call
voting (as opposed to various indices of legislative positions on
particular issues) has found that constituent preferences explain a large
and increasing fraction of such votes: that is, legislators from geographic
districts represent the preferences of their constituents on virtually all
important legislation. See James M. Snyder Jr., Constituency
Preferences: California Ballot Propositions, 1974–90, 21 Legis. Stud.
Q. 463, 477–81 (1996) (finding constituency preferences are better than
party preferences for predicting votes on public goods and regulation
issues).
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counter-majoritarian, in that they override median voter preferences
in lesser-developed jurisdictions. Still, the Clean Air Act succeeded
because representatives from older, dirtier parts of the country were a
majority in Congress.
The Clean Water Act was another successful attempt at
environmental federalization. Unlike the Clean Air Act—key
provisions of which were opposed by members of Congress from newer
and cleaner states—the Clean Water Act’s key provisions—creating a
federal subsidy for new and improved local sewer systems—received
universal Congressional support. Those subsidies were a form of
political pork, representing a transfer from residents of less
industrialized localities to cities that had already developed or which
were more rapidly developing polluting industries.
Finally, the history of failed Congressional attempts to enact a
federal climate change statute clearly illustrates how when states have
diverged significantly—in the case of climate change, in their
predominant energy source for electricity generation and therefore
level of carbon-dioxide emissions—the variation may be so great as to
preclude any general federal regulatory statute from being enacted.
A.
1.

American Regional Economic Development,
and Environmental Regulation, Circa 1970

The Undeveloped, Unpolluted and Accessible South and West

One of the most remarkable features of American legal scholarship
about federalism is the certainty with which scholars assert that the
United States is really just one big vast homogeneous blob, with few if
any significant regional differences.29 However debatable today, this
belief was simply incorrect for most of the twentieth century. By
1970, the United States looked very much like a simple twojurisdiction world with one jurisdiction very highly developed and
environmentally degraded, the other relatively little developed with a
vast supply of pristine (and cheap) natural resources, and with the
two jurisdictions finally linked by a new, very low cost means of mass
transportation, the interstate highway system.
Legal scholars seem to forget how much America changed after
World War II. Over the period 1939–1964, total U.S. manufacturing
employment increased by sixty-nine percent, and even in 1953—after
Japan and Europe were well along the route to recovering from the
destruction of World War II—the United States accounted for fifty
percent of the world’s manufacturing production.30 Although the
29.

See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 944 (1994) (distinguishing
the individual states in the United States from Catalonia in Spain).

30.

Paul Bairoch, International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,
11. J. Euro. Econ. Hist. 269, 299 (1982).
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largest percentage increases in manufacturing employment during this
period occurred in Texas, California, and Florida,31 the largest
absolute increases were concentrated in the region stretching from
New York, across Pennsylvania, to the Great Lakes states.32
Along with a massive increase in the level of manufacturing came
a change in its location. Unprecedented migration decreased farm
population from thirty million people, or twenty-three percent of the
national population, in 1940, to roughly ten million people, or less
than five percent of the national population in 1970.33 This migration
was primarily from the farm to the suburb. A 1946–47 Bureau of
Labor Statistics report found that in the six metropolitan regions
surveyed, suburbs accounted for sixty-two percent of construction
while the national suburban growth rate was ten times that of central
cities by 1950.34 Manufacturing, which even in the early twentieth
century had been concentrated in urban areas proximate to rail lines
and/or shipping ports,35 became increasingly dispersed. By 1963,
industrial employment was more than half suburban-based, and by
1981, two-thirds of all manufacturing activity took place in suburban
industrial parks of the suburbs.36
As late as 1965, American industrial growth was concentrated in
newer suburban areas in the old industrial heartland of the country,
the upper Midwest and Northeast. The Southern and Western regions
of the country remained relatively undeveloped. Between 1940 and
1960, population density increased in every part of the country, but
by far the largest increases in density were in the developed Northeast
and Midwest. Aside from Florida, Georgia, and Texas, the Southern
states had small absolute increases in density, and some states, such
as West Virginia and Mississippi actually lost population.37 Even
31.

See Gunnar Alexandersson, Geography of Manufacturing 24
(1967) (with increases of, respectively, 268, 192, and 225%).

32.

Id. These states thus increased what had been position of regional
dominance in manufacturing; as late as 1937, seventy-two percent of all
manufacturing in the United States came from the seventeen
Northeastern and Midwestern states. Bernard L. Weinstein &
Robert F. Firestine, Regional Growth and Decline in the
United States: The Rise of the Sunbelt State and the Decline
of the Northeast 58 (1978).

33.

David B. Danbom, Born in the Country: A History of Rural
America 245 (2d ed. 2006).

34.

Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization
of the United States 238 (1985).

35.

Id. at 113.

36.

Id. at 267.

37.

U.S. Census Bureau, Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical Abstract
of the United States: 1981, at 10–11 tbl.9 (1981).
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though inland Western states added postwar population at a
tremendous rate, they remained far less densely developed than the
older Northeastern and Midwestern states.38 As late as 1970, when the
population of every Northeastern and Midwestern state was heavily
concentrated in urban versus rural areas, many Southern states had
as many or more people living in rural areas than in urban areas.39
The South is especially important in understanding regional
development patterns as they existed around 1970.40 With the
exception of Florida and Texas, southern manufacturing employment
was concentrated in labor-intensive, low wage industries. Indeed, even
in 1977, one of the dominant Southern industries, apparel, paid the
lowest hourly wage of any of the SIC two-digit industry categories
(another regionally important industry, textile, was third lowest at
$4.07).41 In the South, such low wage industries were the norm, not
the exception. Importantly, throughout the early post-war period,
Southern wages and incomes continued the long historical pattern of
lagging far behind national averages.42 In areas where low wage
industries such as textiles and lumber dominated—as in east
Tennessee—wage differentials between Southern and Northern
workers were actually increasing: in eighteen east Tennessee counties,
“average annual wages fell from eighty to seventy-seven percent of the
national average between 1958 and 1963.”43

38.

In 1960, for instance, the most densely developed mountain states of
Colorado and Arizona had population densities of only approximately
seventeen and eleven persons per square mile, respectively, while the
least developed Rust Belt states of Wisconsin and Indiana stood at
seventy-three and 180 persons per square mile. Id.

39.

In 1970, both North and South Carolina had more rural than urban
residents. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce,
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to
1970, Part I, at 32, 35 (Bicentennial ed., 1975).

40.

The great surge in Western economic development did not occur until
the 1990s, and in many ways, Western economic development differs
from Southern economic development. The inland West has traditionally
had a heavy concentration of immobile extractive industries such as
mining and timber, and the coastal West developed virtually as a
separate economic market centered around California until well after
World War II. See Carol E. Heim, Structural Changes: Regional and
Urban, in III The Cambridge Economic History of the United
States: The Twentieth Century 93, 99–100, 127–28, 154–55
(Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 2000).

41.

Id.

42.

Id. at 114–15.

43.

James C. Cobb, The Selling of the South: The Southern
Crusade for Industrial Development, 1936–1990, at 114 (2d ed.
1993).
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Despite its advantages in attracting labor-intensive industry, the
South actually lost population throughout the 1950s and 1960s. By
the early 1970s, however, these trends were in the process of dramatic
reversal. The economies of the Southern states had begun the famous
“sunbelt” take off. These states had a net gain from migration of 2.9
million between 1970 and 1976,44 and during the early 1970s, grew by
5.1 million persons, more than the rest of the country combined (with
more than one and one half times as many migrants as even the
rapidly growing West).45 The extent of the regional redistribution is
demonstrated by the fact that between 1967 and 1977, the New
England, mid-Atlantic, and Great Lakes states all lost manufacturing
jobs, with New York and Pennsylvania experiencing declines of more
than fifteen percent. During that same period, the Southwest and
Mountain states all saw manufacturing employment increase by more
than fifteen percent, and manufacturing continued to shift to Texas,
Florida, and California, despite already high levels.46 During the
1970s, Texas alone added more non-farm jobs than Michigan, Illinois,
Ohio, and Massachusetts combined.47 Between 1970 and 1975, every
southern industry except mining grew faster than the national
average.48
On the one hand, because it was relatively undeveloped, the
South offered industries cheap land, labor and raw materials.
Southern states and localities aggressively marketed their abundant
and largely unused supply of water and land, a message conveyed by
an Orlando, Florida advertisement captioning a healthy orange with
the assurance that “there’s profitable growing room in Orlando.”49
Petrochemical companies consistently identified the existence of raw
materials and cheap barge transportation for access to foreign markets
as the key reason for opening new operations in the South and
Southwest.50 In 1969, for instance, BASF announced that it had
chosen to locate a new $100 million petrochemical plant in Beaufort,
44.

Id. at 188.

45.

Weinstein & Firestine, supra note 32, at 3.

46.

H.D. Watts, Industrial Geography 4 fig.1.3 (1987).

47.

James C. Cobb, Industrialization and Southern Society, 1877–
1984, at 57 (1984).

48.

Cobb, supra note 43, at 188; Weinstein & Firestine, supra note 32,
at 5. The South received more than half of all new manufacturing jobs
created between 1962 and 1978, and although manufacturing
decentralized to suburban rings in the South and West, unlike their
Northern counterparts, Southern and Western cities actually gained
manufacturing jobs in their central cities between 1947 and 1972. Heim,
supra note 40, at 155.

49.

Cobb, supra note 43, at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted).

50.

Id. at 213.
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South Carolina, because Beaufort offered both cheap land (1800 acres,
much of it state-owned) and the five million gallons of fresh water
that the plant would need each day.51
The same was true in the pulp and paper industry. After World
War II, pulp and paper production in the Southeastern states
skyrocketed, increasing from 2.7 million cords in 1939 to 7.7 million
cords in 1951, and by 1956 had almost overtaken cotton growing as
the most important Southern industry.52 As one industry observer
explained:
The whole thing boils down pretty much to wood supply and
the costs involved. . . . The South can’t be beaten
now. . . . [T]he motorized small saws work like a charm,
and . . . the country is so flat that [the mills] can be moved
about. The saws will work in the north too, but here production
per man can never be so great as in the South because of the
more difficult terrain. The same thing is going to hurt the West
in second growth, too.53

More generally, as the Japanese consul general in Atlanta explained,
“[o]lder industries like textiles are being phased out in Japan and
exported to other countries. . . . We will put these high-pollution
industries where there is space and water enough to handle
them . . . like here in the South.”54
Even given the huge differences in the cost of land, labor and
energy, the late 1960s incentive for industrial relocation to the
relatively undeveloped Southern and Western regions of the United
States would not have been nearly as strong were it not for the
interstate highway system. Authorized in 1956 at an original price tag
of twenty-six billion dollars (ninety percent of which would be paid by
the federal government), by the early 1970s the 41,000 mile Interstate
system was finally nearing completion.55 The Interstate system
completely altered industrial transportation cost structure. Small
towns that had been far from rail heads got freeway interchanges and
became for the first time truly part of the interstate and international
market. The trucking industry exploded, with goods shipped by truck

51.

Id. at 240.

52.

David C. Smith, History of Papermaking in the United States
(1691–1969) 419 (1971).

53.

Id. at 549 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

54.

Cobb, supra note 43, at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted).

55.

On the ultimately successful political battle for the interstate system,
see generally Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway
Politics, 1939–1989, at 69–100 (rev. ed. 1990) (discussing the political
battle to create American highways during the Eisenhower era).
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increasing by 257% between 1955 and 1990.56 By 1970, it had become
possible to ship goods five hundred miles overnight by truck, and over
fifty percent of truck traffic was on the interstates.57 The
transportation revolution brought by the Interstate had a dramatic
effect on development patterns and population distribution. During
the 1950s, a net of five million people left non-metropolitan areas, a
trend that was especially pronounced in the South, where the
mechanization of cotton harvesting and the consequent end of the
sharecropper system generated a huge migration to Northern cities of
the rural poor.58 Outmigration from rural areas began to diminish
during the 1960s, but it was not until the 1970–1973 period that
population growth in rural counties actually exceeded the growth in
urban and suburban counties.59 For the first time in the twentieth
century, population in rural areas lying outside Census-defined
metropolitan areas grew faster than population in metro areas.60
Significantly, the greatest shift in population trends occurred in the
most rural counties, those that were adjacent to metropolitan areas.61
Economic incentives for industrial relocation were not the only
force driving the accelerating development of the Southern and
Western United States. By the late 1960s, the United States had
achieved an unprecedented level of mass affluence. Affluence vastly
increased the demand for local environmental quality and distant
undeveloped natural resources. The ninety-one percent growth in
population in the Western states over the 1950–1976 period was the
largest for any region of the country.62 In Florida (whose 1970s
population increase of 1.6 million was bigger than the growth of the
twenty-one Northeastern and North-central rust-belt states
combined)63 growth was fueled initially by tourism, aerospace, and the
relocation of northern retirees.64 With rapidly increasing energy and
commodity prices, the cost of living advantage of Sunbelt states

56.

Tom Lewis, Divided Highways: Building the Interstate
Highways, Transforming American Life 286 (Cornell Paperbacks
2013) (1997).

57.

Id. at 286–87.

58.

Calvin L. Beale, Econ. Res. Serv. ERS-605, The Revival of
Population Growth in Nonmetropolitan America 4 (1975).

59.

Id. at 6.

60.

Id. Urban centers with more than fifty-thousand people were considered
metro areas. Id. at 6 n.2.

61.

Id. at 7.

62.

Weinstein & Firestine, supra note 32, at 3 tbl.1.1.

63.

Cobb, supra note 47, at 55.

64.

Id. at 53–56.
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became even larger than its already large historical level.65 While
inherently difficult to measure, surveys around this time consistently
showed that the “amenities [quality of life] of the rapidly growing
southern and western regions—less environmental degradation, lower
population densities, more moderate climates, ease of transportation,
access to recreational activities, lower crime rates” were a major
attraction both to a burgeoning retirement-age population and
younger families.66
These stylized facts are crucial in understanding the forces behind
environmental federalization in the United States. Federal
environmental legislation was passed just as the great takeoff in
Southern and Western economic development was beginning, years
before increases in wealth, income and development increased the
demand for local environmental amenities there. As historian James
Cobb observes, even in the 1970s, there remained in the South
“sparsely populated rural areas where industrial activity was at a
minimum. Pollution hardly seemed a problem in such locales where
citizens were considerably more interested in jobs and a better
standard of living than in the pristine quality of air and water, which
they took for granted.”67 Employers, employees, and retirees were all
racing south and west during the late 1960s, but they were doing so
because the Southern and Western states offered a low cost, relatively
pristine and undeveloped natural environment. Even as Environmentalism gathered federal momentum, the Southern states continued
to furiously compete for capital by exempting new industry from state
and local taxes68 and remained more interested in recruiting industry
than in cleaning up the environment.69
The Southern and Western states were competing to attract
business through tax breaks, but they were not caught in some kind
of downward regulatory spiral. Indeed, as development in the West
and South caught up with development in the Northeast and
Midwest, the demand for environmental quality and resource
preservation grew also. For instance, Southern states made up twelve
of the top twenty-five states in the National Wildlife Federation’s
65.

Id. at 56–57.

66.

Bernard L. Weinstein & John Rees, Sunbelt/Frostbelt Confrontation?, in
Plant Closings: Public or Private Choices? 193, 200–01 (Richard
B. McKenzie ed., rev. ed. 1984).

67.

Cobb, supra note 43, at 243.

68.

Indeed, five of the seven most aggressive states in granting such
exemptions were located in the South, and by the mid-1960s, Alabama,
Mississippi, and Louisiana were offering ten-year exemptions on all state
and local taxes, while South Carolina and Kentucky were offering fiveyear exemptions on local taxes. Id. at 48.

69.

Id. at 238.
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1979 ranking of state hazardous waste regulatory stringency.70 The
most significant variable explaining the variation across the states in
the intensity of state hazardous waste regulation was the level of state
industrialization.71
Work by Arik Levinson provides even more compelling evidence
for the model of anticompetitive federal mandates.72 Commerce
Department data on industry pollution abatement costs are a widely
used measure of state environmental compliance costs and regulatory
stringency. Levinson found that the ranking of state environmental
regulatory stringency over the 1977–1994 period changed radically
when abatement cost data were adjusted to control for the pollution
intensivity of each industry. Given their concentration of heavy
polluting industry, rust-belt states such as Delaware, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio were much more lenient than the raw
abatement cost numbers would imply. By the same token, Western
clean-industry states—such as Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico,
and Oregon—had very stringent environmental standards.73
2.

The Environmental Kuznets Curve Confirmed: Development and
the Demand for Local Environmental Protection in Older America

Throughout history, wealth accumulated from early development
has increased leisure time and stimulated a new sort of demand
among residents of developed communities jurisdiction: the demand
for natural recreational opportunities and for a cleaner local
environment.74 While there are a variety of factors that explain local
demand for environmental quality,75 there is now strong empirical

70.

See James P. Lester et. al., Hazardous Wastes, Politics, and Public
Policy: A Comparative State Analysis, 36 W. Pol. Q. 257, 268 tbl.1
(1983).

71.

Id. at 269 tbl.2.

72.

Arik Levinson, An Industry-Adjusted Index of State Environmental
Compliance Costs, in Behavioral and Distributional Effects of
Environmental Policy 131 (Carlo Carraro & Gilbert E. Metcalf eds.,
2001).

73.

Id. at 134–39.

74.

For a general discussion, see John Towner, An Historical
Geography of Recreation and Tourism in the Western World,
1540–1940 (1996) (discussing the roles of recreation and tourism on
land use across time and place), and on the America “city beautiful”
movement, an early twentieth century manifestation of this
phenomenon, see Martin V. Melosi, Garbage in the Cities:
Refuse, Reform, and the Environment, 1880–1980, at 110–12
(1981).

75.

For an early discussion of which factors seem to explain environmental
preferences, see Kent D. Van Liere & Riley E. Dunlap, The Social Bases
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evidence that as wealth and income increase, so too does a person’s
demand for local environmental quality.76 At the country level, there
has been repeated confirmation of an inverted U-shaped relationship
between a country’s per capita income and its environmental
quality:77 as national income increases, the level of conventional
pollutants increases, but then, as income continues to increase,
pollution falls. While there are clearly both demand and supply
(technological) considerations at work in causing this relationship, its
existence is well established.78
of Environmental Concern: A Review of Hypotheses, Explanations and
Empirical Evidence, 44 Pub. Op. Q. 181 (1980).
76.

For empirical evidence supporting this assumption, see Robert Deacon
& Perry Shapiro, Private Preference for Collective Goods Revealed
Through Voting on Referenda, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 943 (1975) (finding
that income, along with occupation, political preference, education, and
location, was an important factor in voting for environmental equality);
Mary E. Deily & Wayne B. Gray, Enforcement of Pollution Regulations
in a Declining Industry, 21 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 260, 267–69
(1991) (determining that EPA enforcement is less likely as the plant
employs more of the community and enforcement increases the risk of
plant closure by more than ten percent); William A. Fischel,
Determinants of Voting on Environmental Quality: A Study of New
Hampshire Pulp Mill Referendum, 6 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 107,
115 (1979) (using a survey of individual voter responses to find “income,
occupation, and education are rather robust determinants of preferences
about environmental equality”); Matthew E. Kahn & John G.
Matsusaka, Demand for Environmental Goods: Evidence from Voting
Patterns on California Initiatives, 40 J.L. & Econ. 137 (1997) (finding
demand for environmental goods increases with income except for the
demand from the highest income levels).

77.

There has been repeated confirmation of the observation that the level
of some important pollutants follows an inverted U-shaped pattern
relative to national per capita income. See, e.g., Sander M. de Bruyn,
Economic Growth and the Environment: An Empirical
Analysis 77–98 (2000); Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Kreuger,
Economic Growth and the Environment, 110 Q.J. Econ. 353 (1995);
F.G. Hank Hilton & Arik Levinson, Factoring the Environmental
Kuznets Curve: Evidence from Automotive Lead Emissions, 35 J.
Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 126, 136 fig.3 (1998); Thomas M. Selden &
Daqing Song, Environmental Quality and Development: Is There a
Kuznets Curve for Air Pollution Emissions?, 27 J. Envtl. Econ. &
Mgmt. 147 (1994); Thomas M. Seldon & Daqing Song, Neoclassical
Growth, the J Curve for Abatement, and the Inverted U Curve for
Pollution, 29 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 162, 165–67 (1995).

78.

For the general notion that the more or less natural process of national
economic growth involves a progression from clean self-sustaining
economies through dirty industrialization to a clean post-industrial
stage, see Kenneth Arrow et al., Economic Growth, Carrying Capacity,
and the Environment, 268 Science 520 (1995). James Andreoni and
Arik Levinson showed that when there are economies of scale in abating
pollution generated as an undesirable by-product of producing private
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B.

Air Pollution Circa 1970: Effective State and Local Regulation

The environmental Kuznets curve suggests that the radically
different levels of economic development and environmental
degradation in various American regions circa 1970 should have led to
radically different levels of demand for environmental regulation. As
of 1970, the majority of states did not even have a generalized air
pollution problem for which a comprehensive state program made
sense.79 But, crucially, those states that did have a problem were
doing something about it.
1. Effective Local Regulation to Curb the Black
Carbon (Coal Smoke) Problem

During the early twentieth century, the major air pollution
problem confronting large American cities was the smoke from coal
burned in residential and industrial uses. The problem appeared in
those cities that relied upon dirty bituminous coal, such as St. Louis
(which burned cheap but highly impure coal mined from southern
Illinois)80 and Pittsburgh (burning local southwestern Pennsylvania
coal).81 Thirty or forty years ago, historians and political scientists
were quick to conclude that these cities had very little success in
dealing with their smoke problem.82
More recent work reveals to the contrary a history of active and
ultimately effective local regulation to reduce smoke.83 Antismoke
activism in cities such as Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, St. Louis,
consumption goods, increases in income will alone eventually generate a
demand for higher levels of abatement and less pollution. James
Andreoni & Arik Levinson, The Simple Analytics of the Environmental
Kuznets Curve, 80 J. Pub. Econ. 269, 279–81 (2001). Still there
remains some dispute in the literature as to the theoretical explanation
for why the environmental Kuznets curve exists. For a survey, see
Masaski Kijima, Katsumasa Nishide & Atsuyuki Ohyama, Economic
Models for the Environmental Kuznets Curve: A Survey, 34 J. Econ.
Dynamics & Control 1187 (2010).
79.

This is clearly demonstrated by Indur Goklany, Clearing the Air:
The Real Story of the War on Air Pollution 27–29 (1999).

80.

R. Dale Grinder, The Battle for Clean Air: The Smoke Problem in PostCivil War America, in Pollution and Reform in American Cities,
1870–1930, at 83, 100–01 (Martin V. Melosi ed., 1980).

81.

Charles O. Jones, Clean Air: The Policies and Politics of
Pollution Control 22 (1975).

82.

See, e.g., J. Clarence Davies III, The Politics of Pollution 128
(1970); Jones, supra note 81, at 23–35; Grinder, supra note 80, at 100–
01.

83.

See generally David Stradling, Smokestacks and Progressives:
Environmentalists, Engineers, and Air Quality in America,
1881–1951 (1999).
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and Pittsburgh was a constant during the early twentieth century.84
By the mid-twentieth century, such local activism had produced clear
positive results. Despite continuing opposition from the producers of
high sulfur (or soft) coal, by 1946, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and
Cincinnati had all passed ordinances requiring the use of either clean
(low sulfur and fly ash) coal or mechanical stokers.85 Studies by
independent bodies showed that the ordinances produced dramatic
reductions in soot fall (Cincinnati)86 and periods of thick smoke (St.
Louis).87 Even in cities where lobbying and public relations efforts by
soft coal producers and coal-bearing railroads kept high-volatile coal
(soft coal) in use in a number of cities (such as Cleveland,
Philadelphia, and Providence),88 smoke was eventually made subject
to local regulation.89 More municipalities passed air-pollution-control
ordinances during the 1940s than during any other decade between
1880 and 1980.90 Along with a shift away from coal and toward other
heating fuels, such as oil and natural gas, by the early 1950s, local
regulation had effectively ended the problem of smoke pollution in
American cities.91
A constant theme in local efforts to curb the smoke problem was
the race-to-the-top rationale. Reacting to a large increase in soot
between 1936 and 1947 as a consequence of its shift from bituminous
to anthracite coal, New York City activists and political leaders
argued in the late 1940s that New York should not be left behind
Pittsburgh and St. Louis.92 Arguments in Pittsburgh centered not
only around smoke’s health and cleanliness effects, but also how these
led to the residential exodus to the suburbs.93 Rather than competing
to cut smoke regulation, cities hurried to match the dramatic
reductions achieved elsewhere.
84.

Id. at 37–151.

85.

Id. at 163–75.

86.

The Smoke Abatement League found that during the first eight years of
Cincinnati’s ordinance restricting high-volatile coal, there was fifty
percent less soot fall in Cincinnati. Id. at 175.

87.

See id. at 167 (reporting an 83.5% reduction in hours of thick smoke
from the previous year in St. Louis).

88.

Id. at 174.

89.

See id. at 179–80 (noting Cleveland’s decision to reorganize its
regulators and to form the Division of Air Pollution Control in lieu of
adopting new regulations).

90.

Arthur C. Stern, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United
States, 32 J. Air Pollution Control Ass’n. 44, 47 (1982).

91.

See Goklany, supra note 79, at 21.

92.

Stradling, supra note 83, at 178.

93.

Id. at 169.
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2. State and Local Responses to Sulfur Dioxide and Smog Pollution

By the 1950s, the air pollution problem was perceived not as
smoke but “smog.” By the end of the 1940s, journalistic accounts
increasingly portrayed the health effects of chemical fumes as problem
with national scope, from the “nauseating gases” from the San
Francisco bay area oil refineries to the “sickening odor of oil or gas”
in New Orleans.94 A highly publicized incident of toxic smog on
Halloween, 1948 in Donora, Pennsylvania, that left nineteen people
dead from asphyxiation was ascribed to emissions from a local zinc
smelting plant.95
Cities and localities reacted to the new industrial air pollution
problem in ways that were rational and, given the state of knowledge
regarding the various causes of air pollution, relatively effective. The
fact that air pollution spilled over across the separate political
jurisdictions making up industrial metropolitan areas was clearly
recognized by local government, and by 1965, half of all local air
control programs had jurisdiction over an entire county or several
counties.96 Moreover, recognizing that the urban air pollution problem
was a health problem, over eighty percent of the local air pollution
control agencies created between 1961 and 1965 were placed within
health departments.97 During the 1960s, a number of cities and
counties enacted stringent air pollution emissions ordinances.98 And,
as was often the case, when highly developed urban population
centers within a state that had acted locally to control pollution also
had majoritarian control at the centralized (state level), they pushed
for state standards to complement local regulations. In Pennsylvania,
for instance, the state Air Pollution Control Commission, chaired by a
Bethlehem Steel official, recommended a very lax state sulfur dioxide
standard of 100 μg/m3. Public meetings in Pittsburgh and
Philadelphia generated widespread public support for a stricter
standard; support also came from the United Steelworkers, the
congressman from the Pittsburgh steel area, and the governor of
Pennsylvania.99 In New York City, the adverse health effects of sulfur
dioxide emissions from coal combustion led the City Council in 1965
94.

Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted).

95.

Lynne Page Snyder, “The Death-Dealing Smog Over Donora,
Pennsylvania”: Industrial Air Pollution, Public Health, and Federal
Policy, 1915–1963, at 20–30 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania).

96.

Davies, supra note 82, at 128.

97.

Id.

98.

Samuel P. Hays, The Politics of Environmental Administration, in
Explorations in Environmental History 418, 438–39 (1998).

99.

Id. at 439.
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to pass an ordinance with a five-year schedule for reducing sulfur
emissions.100 The next year, the states of New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Connecticut all announced a plan to combat air
pollution from coal.101 In 1967, the Secretary of HEW reported that
virtually all American cities had unhealthy levels of sulfur dioxide and
recommended reducing reliance on soft coal.102 The threat of
increasingly strict regulation in the older, developed Northeastern
states caused the coal industry coalition—especially coal users—to
revise their traditional opposition to federal regulation. As Fred
Tucker, manager of pollution control services for National Steel
Corporation complained in Congressional testimony, “people . . .
appear to be playing a numbers game with [state] air quality
standards, by setting lower and lower allowable pollutant levels in
state standards.”103
Smog caused by lower tropospheric ozone, had first become a
headline problem with several notorious incidents during the 1940s in
the Los Angeles basin.104 By 1959, California had not only funded the
research that identified automobile emissions as the cause of smog, it
had also passed a statute regulating such automobile emissions.105
During the 1940s and 1950s, however, smog was a problem confined
to California and a few other major American metropolitan areas.106
Although the entire California delegation pressed annually for federal
legislation to deal with automobile exhaust emissions, they did not
succeed until the 1960s, by which time the smog problem had spread
to a number of other major metropolitan areas.107

100. Richard H.K. Vietor, Environmental Politics and the Coal
Coalition 138–40 (1980).
101. Christopher J. Bailey, Congress and Air
Environmental Policies in the USA 129 (1998).

Pollution:

102. Id.
103. Hays, supra note 98, at 567 n.94.
104. Most notorious of all was the “daylight dimout” of September 8, 1943,
when “[t]housands of eyes smarted, many wept, sneezed and
coughed[ and] [t]hroughout the downtown area and into the foothills the
fumes spread their irritation.” James E. Krier & Edmund Ursin,
Pollution and Policy: A Case Essay on California and
Federal Experience with Motor Vehicle Air Pollution 1940–
1974, at 53 (1977) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
105. Id. at 127–32.
106. Bailey, supra note 101, at 86–89.
107. Id. at 89–108.
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C.

How Development Created Local Demand for Pollution Reduction:
The Postwar Water Pollution Story

By the late 1960s, postwar economic development had had the
ironic effect of both generating some infamously polluted waterways
and creating economically affluent citizens who wanted to use those
waterways for leisure time pursuits such as fishing and boating. In
addition, given the importance of clean water as an input in the
production process, heavily polluted rivers stood as an obstacle to
further local industrial development. Thus by 1970, in industrialized
localities, there was both a problem—polluted waterways—and multipronged demand for cleanup on the part of both producers of private
goods and would-be consumers of the local public good of clean water.
This Part recounts those developments.
By the late 1960s, the Great Lakes and Northeastern regions, with
old industrial facilities that had been operating near capacity for two
decades, and old wastewater and water treatment plants, suffered
most acutely, and most visibly from water pollution. It was, after all,
the burning Cuyahoga River in Cleveland that made the front page of
the New York Times as the cover story dramatizing the nation’s
water pollution woes.108 In the Southeast, paper mills had become a
major industrial presence and a serious pollution problem.109 Coal,
steel, and other industrial raw materials were transported along
Eastern and Midwestern rivers; major oil refineries were concentrated
in that region of the country as well.
Matters were far different west of the Mississippi. In the arid
West, water quantity and fears of water shortage have always been a
much greater concern than water quality. What water quality issues
existed in the West centered around the effect of alternative timber
harvest and grazing practices on runoff.110 Prior to the federal
reclamation movement, major Western rivers were far too
unreliable—flooding in the spring, and drying up in the summer—to
be useful for navigation and commerce. As a consequence, for the
most part, the largest Western cities are not located on major rivers.
In the late 1960s, few if any Western cities had water treatment
problems.
108. The burning of the Cuyahoga, used as an example of the need for
federal action, was especially ironic, for as observed by Jonathan H.
Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of
Environmental Protection, 14 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 89, 108 (2002),
local voters had already approved spending over $100 million to clean
up the Cuyahoga. In fact, the Cuyahoga story illustrates the point made
here: in heavily industrialized and polluted localities, citizens were
already approving costly local action to reduce pollution.
109. Susan Hunter & Richard W. Waterman, Enforcing the Law:
The Case of the Clean Water Acts 15, 20–21 (1996).
110. To a substantial degree, this remains true today. See id. at 16–18.
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1. Subsidies and the Demand for Clean Water: The Maine Example

East of the Mississippi, water pollution had become a serious
obstacle to further economic growth. A wonderful illustration of the
Eastern dilemma is provided by the state of Maine.111 By the 1920s,
there were “thirty-seven pulp and paper mills, eighty textile mills, and
eleven tanneries . . . dumping thousands of tons of tanning liquors,
sulfite, bleach, dye, and . . . wood fiber into [Maine] rivers . . . .”112
Post–World War II economic expansion meant higher levels of
pollution than ever before, and in 1941 pollution along the
Androscoggin Valley became so severe that a group of fifty-two
Lewiston businessmen organized and petitioned the State Legislature
for action to halt sulfite dumping by upstream paper mills and
tanneries. According to environmental historian Richard Judd:
Their complaints were primarily economic: pollution threatened
rental, commercial, and agricultural property along the river;
caustic fumes discolored buildings and tarnished and etched
displays of kitchenware and jewelry; and the stench distracted
and debilitated people working near the river, undermined pride
in the community, damaged the town’s commercial reputation,
and devastated the local tourist trade.113

During the 1950s, however, cities such as Lewiston realized that the
city’s economic interest in water pollution control was ambiguous.
Upstream pollution had actually limited the city’s ability to attract
similar industrial users because it cut the supply of industrial grade
soft water (a production input) and the stench made the city
unattractive for industries that might have diversified its economic
base.114 But as grassroots concern with water pollution mounted
during the early 1950s, cities themselves became targets, for their
universal practice was to dump raw sewage into rivers. The cities
argued that wastewater treatment would be wasted without pollution
control by upstream mills.115 But the textile industry was in the
process of moving to the South, and competition from Southern mills
began to create excess capacity in the generally healthy pulp and
paper industry. Manufacturing employment in Maine fell by 6600
persons in the year 1954 alone.116
111. The following account is drawn entirely from Richard W. Judd, The
Coming of the Clean Waters Acts in Maine, 1941–1961, 14 Envtl.
Hist. Rev. 50 (1990).
112. Id. at 53.
113. Id. at 54.
114. Id. at 57.
115. Id. at 59.
116. Id. at 60.
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It was in this climate that Edmund Muskie became governor in
1953. For the next four years, his administration championed New
Deal–style statewide economic redevelopment.117 Muskie recognized
that clean water would provide an “inducement for industries to
locate in this State,” but he nonetheless expedited approval of permits
for a new tannery after being assured by residents that the river was
already so bad that another factory would be worth far more in jobs
than it would cost in additional pollution.118 By 1955, water pollution
was a dominant issue in the State legislature, and by 1957 the
legislature had before it a proposed water quality classification of
over twelve thousand miles of rivers and coastal waters and four
hundred individual recommendations for streams or sections of
streams.119 Following industry and the Maine Municipal Association’s
objections to the classifications, a redraft from the Natural Resources
Committee lowered the classifications, in many cases below existing
stream quality.120
The problem was not that Maine political leaders were interested
in further weakening regulation, and degrading water quality, as a
way to attract industry. As Governor, Muskie perceived that the
national problem was precisely the opposite, that industries were
“racing to locate at the dwindling number of sites along our major
water bodies . . . where large volumes of satisfactory water can still be
secure without excessive expense for treatment.”121 Moreover, with the
advent of the interstate highway system, the benefits of clean water
for Maine’s burgeoning tourist industry were increasingly appreciated
by Muskie and other state political leaders.122
That both existing industry and Maine municipalities so strongly
opposed water pollution regulation is explained not by their
unwillingness to invest in water treatment, but rather by the
investments they had already made. As a Maine Department of
Development official aptly described the dilemma:
Every industry . . . would dearly like clean water to use, but by
agreement among them each mill, plant, and factory spends
money to purify the water it uses and adds its wastes to the
pollution of our streams and rivers when it would cost no more
to build disposal plants to keep waste out of the water . . . [T]he
problem of attracting any industry needing clean water in its
117. Id.
118. Id. at 61 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id. at 62–63.
120. Id. at 63.
121. Id. at 63–64.
122. Id. at 64.
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process to the State of Maine is obviously doubled if that
industry must make arrangements for a water purification
system before it can start operation.123

In the late 1950s, two developments broke the stalemate in Maine
state–water pollution law. Postwar affluence and enhanced leisure
made Maine’s relatively undeveloped state an asset rather than a
liability as its forests and coastlines were discovered by a new
generation of recreational users. Even more importantly, 1956
Amendments to the 1948 Water Pollution Control Act allocated $500
million over a ten-year period for community sewage facility
construction on a thirty percent matching basis.124 This was sufficient
inducement for small towns to begin sewage treatment construction
programs.125 After being reelected in 1957, Muskie succeeded in
getting the state legislature to follow with a state program under
which the state would fund an additional twenty percent of the cost
of sewage treatment construction, thus giving Maine towns a
combined fifty percent state-federal subsidy. In 1959, both state and
federal grants were increased.126
The sewage treatment subsidy dramatically changed the state’s
political landscape. Whereas the Maine Municipal Association had
long been allied with industry in opposing water pollution regulation,
it switched and became a very strong supporter of clean water and
industrial controls.127 In 1961, reclassification of the heavily polluted
Kennebec (to be suitable for recreational fishing and boating) met
with hardly any opposition; significantly, political leaders from
Augusta, traditional allies of industrial polluters upstream, supported
the reclassification and were confident that the city “could manage
treatment costs over the comfortable fifteen year time limit.”128 By
1966, with the reclassification of the Penobscot and Androscoggin, the
three largest rivers in the state had been reclassified to provide for
fish restoration, recreation, industrial water supply and a seventypercent reduction in organic pollutants.129
2. Effective State Action for Clean Water in the Rust Belt

Admittedly, it was not water pollution problems in remote and
sparsely populated Maine that made the headlines in the 1960s and
123. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id. at 65.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 65–66.
127. Id. at 66.
128. Id. at 67.
129. Id.
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1970s. But the political and economic story in Maine was functionally
the same as in Chicago, Cleveland, St. Louis, and Detroit. The
problems on the Androscoggin—old industries and old cities, each
facing large costs of moving from a system based on cleaning up water
before it was used to one in which wastewater was to be treated
before being discharged—were the same as those found on the
Calumet (carrying pollution from Gary, Indiana, factories), Delaware,
Detroit, Hudson, and perhaps most infamously, Cuyahoga Rivers.
The evidence from these watersheds is increasingly clear on two
crucial points. First, state regulation preceded federal regulation, set
the basic pattern for federal regulation, and continued even when
federal regulations were weakened. Thus, there is no evidence of a
race-to-the-bottom. Second, and even more significantly, these
watersheds were cleaned up primarily because of large, centralized
cleanup subsidies that helped finance the construction of new publicly
owned wastewater treatment works.
Any notion of a race-to-the-bottom is confounded by the clear
history of successful state action in improving water quality. Consider
two of the most notorious examples: the Delaware River and the
Great Lakes. Up until World War II, most municipal wastes along the
Delaware were discharged into that River with little or no
treatment.130 Only twenty percent of the wastes from Camden and
Philadelphia were treated (and then only at the primary level, by
screening out large solids).131 Industrial pollution was also a problem;
by 1941, over two hundred industries discharged ninety-thousand tons
per year of solid and semisolid wastes either directly into the
Delaware or through sewers.132 The level of noxious hydrogen sulfide
gas generated as a byproduct of bacterial decomposition of the wastes
discharged into the river was so great that during World War II, the
metal used in assembling naval radar equipment corroded while on
the assembly line, and “[s]teamship crews would quit after one night
aboard, complaining of the foul-smelling gases.”133
Little was done about Delaware’s pollution problems during
World War II, when the basin was the major wartime shipbuilding
center and the overriding concern was to keep production levels as
130. Shad runs on the Delaware declined from fifteen million to five million
pounds between 1896 and 1904, Bruce Stutz, Natural Lives—
Modern Times: People and Places of the Delaware River 200
(1992), and by 1946, “the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service found twenty
miles of the upper estuary anoxic from the surface to the bottom.” Id.
at 201 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. Ruth Patrick et al., Surface Water Quality: Have the Laws
Been Successful? 10 (1992).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 10–11.
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high as possible. But progress had in fact already been made. Between
1936 and 1942, the Interstate Commission on the Delaware River
Basin (Incodel) had already successfully persuaded riverfront
communities to spend more than ten million dollars to build sewage
collection and treatment systems.134 In 1937, Pennsylvania passed the
Clean Stream Law, which put industrial wastes under legal control.135
After the conclusion of World War II, great progress was made in
dealing with both municipal and industrial pollution. In 1946,
Philadelphia initiated an eighty-million-dollar sewer improvement and
treatment program, and by 1955, the city had opened two new
(primary) treatment plants serving the southwest and southeast
sections of the city.136 By 1961, seventy-one percent of industries in
Pennsylvania treated their wastes before discharging them into rivers,
versus only eight percent in 1941.137
Similar improvements had occurred in the Great Lakes region.
This area, later known as the “Rust Belt,” was the heart of postwar
American industrial expansion, with value added by manufacture
more than doubling in every major metropolitan area on the shores of
the Great Lakes between 1947 and 1963.138 With this tremendous
manufacturing expansion came both an increase in water pollution
and a dramatic increase in demand for local water-based recreational
activities.139 State water pollution control officials had made
tremendous progress in reducing both municipal and industrial
discharges during the 1950s. Between 1952 and 1957, Ohio doubled its
statewide sewage treatment capacity, and in 1959, the Michigan
Water Resources Commission reported that sewage from over ninety
percent of the state’s population was treated before being discharged
into waterways.140 Indiana state regulators stated that thirty-five of
the thirty-seven industrial plants in the Calumet River Basin that
discharged into Lake Michigan were providing adequate treatment for
their wastes, while 132 of 198 industries discharging wastes into Lake
Erie or its tributaries were classified as having adequate treatment.141
By the 1960s, however, local newspapers in the urban centers of
the lower Great Lakes had begun continuing and strident coverage of

134. Id. at 10.
135. Id. at 13.
136. Id. at 11–13.
137. Id. at 13.
138. Terence Kehoe, Cleaning Up the Great
Cooperation to Confrontation 45 (1997).
139. Id. at 45–46.
140. Id. at 44.
141. Id. at 45.
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the environmental apocalypse that was soon to befall local waters. In
1962, the Detroit News warned that “the Great Lakes could become
another Dead Sea,” while the Cleveland Plain Dealer’s two-day frontpage coverage of the Cuyahoga’s sorry state made that river into a
national cause célèbre.142 Sunday newspaper supplements carried color
photos of the worst cases of industrial pollution.143 For decades, the
standard interpretation of this media outcry has been to conclude
that the problems were indeed severe and the direct fault of state
regulators who cared more about industry than about water quality.
This is much too superficial. The most widely respected state
regulators of this era, such as Michigan’s Loring Oeming, seemed
quite clearly to be surprised by the rapid escalation in the public’s
demand for water quality. In a paper presented at the annual meeting
of the National Water Pollution Control Federation in 1963, Oeming
observed that:
[T]he public seems to be demanding a quality of water higher
than that which is now accepted by pollution control authorities
as providing adequate protection. . . . Aesthetic considerations
[and the demand that] the very best obtainable in sanitary
quality is none too good, can be expected to result in gradual
elevation of present quality objectives.144

Speaking before the same group in 1965, a longtime Illinois water
quality official commented on the new federal approach: “Suddenly,
the conservationist, the recreationist, the purist burst forth to
dominate the scene and to take over to a large extent the
administrative control of the federal program.”145
The existing historical evidence suggests that at least some state
regulators really were surprised by rapidly escalating demands for
local regulatory action to reduce water pollution. For instance, after
spending or appropriating well over one million dollars to develop
Sterling State Park on Lake Erie, Michigan authorities were forced to
close the beach in August 1961 because of water contamination.146
This was the only public beach on Lake Erie in the state of Michigan,
and its close proximity to I-75, the interstate highway between

142. Id. at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id.
144. Roy F. Weston, Frank J. Trelease, Leonard B. Dworsky & Loring F.
Oeming, Water Quality Management—Legal, Technical, and
Administrative Aspects, 36 J. Water Pollution Control Fed’n,
1082, 1106 (1964).
145. Kehoe, supra note 138, at 82 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
146. Id. at 56.
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Detroit and Toledo, had made it a prime local mass recreation spot,
with park attendance increasing from roughly 100,000 in 1952 to more
than 1.2 million in 1959.147 The same story took place in Cleveland
and Chicago. The very prosperity that polluted local waters had also
generated the affluence and leisure time that increased local
recreational demand for those waters. In Cleveland, for instance, the
first groups to cry that Lake Erie was dying were commercial and
sport fishermen and local conservationists.148 The citizen leader of
campaign to clean up Cleveland-area waters was an affluent Shaker
Heights automobile dealer who was also an avid fisherman and
boater.149 In Chicago, local newspapers focused on the oil
contamination at Calumet Park Beach, with pictures of boat oars and
swimmers coated with oil.150
It is true that some Great Lakes pollution problems had an
obvious interstate aspect—as in southern Lake Michigan, where
wastes discharged from plants in Gary, Indiana, contaminated Illinois
beaches.151 Still, in terms of the recreational user groups affected, all
the major water pollution problems of the late 1960s Environmentalist
era were intensely local. A 1963 federal study of Lake Michigan found
that water quality in the main body of the Lake was “very high,”
with only the southwest shoreline showing high coliform readings,
excessive algae growth, and high phenol and ammonia levels.152 The
beaches and waters adjacent to Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland were
used by the residents of those cities, not by distant users from other
parts of the United States or other countries. People who suffered the
most harm from local pollution were also the beneficiaries of local
development; indeed, they would not have had the wealth and leisure
time for outdoor recreation without local development.

III. Explaining Federalization: Centralized
Environmental Regulation as Regional Economic
Protectionism and Political Pork
These summary histories of late twentieth-century state and local
efforts to curb air and water pollution are stories of relative success,
but they also depict how state and local environmental regulatory
147. Id.
148. Id. at 61.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 65.
151. Id. The City of Chicago had long since reversed the direction of the
Chicago River to carry its own effluent downstream, into the Illinois
River system and ultimately to the Mississippi, where it became the
problem of downstream cities such as St. Louis.
152. Id.
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efforts were slowed by an appreciation of the cost of environmental
improvement. What they reveal most dramatically, perhaps, is
how widespread the perception was that cleaning up local
environments could also hurt local economies. As I argue below,
federalization of both air and water pollution control succeeded when
a sufficiently large number of U.S. states had reached the stage where
they could agree not so much on the optimal level of pollution
reduction but on the need to shift at least part of that cost to other,
less developed states.
A.

The Clean Water Act: Succeeding Through Subsidies

If, as argued above, both industry and local citizens in heavily
industrialized localities with water pollution problems wanted water
pollution reduced, then simple public choice economics suggests that
there should have been no barrier to the passage of locally efficient
pollution control measures. That is, with both the benefits and costs
of pollution control being internalized to a particular locality, that
locality would have the proper incentive to reduce pollution. However,
concerns of loss of industry were real, and cost is cost. Where there is
a way for industrialized localities to receive the benefits of cleaner
waterways but shift at least part of the cost elsewhere, then such a
move would have made such localities better off relative to a world in
which they bore the entire cost. The best solution for such
industrialized communities would be to have other less polluted and
less developed localities help pay for water pollution reduction.
1. Water Pollution Control Federalization

The stage for comprehensive federal water pollution regulation
was set during the 1960s. It was during this period that the causes
and costs of rectifying the water pollution problem afflicting
industrialized areas was clearly identified. Federal-state conferences
held under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1961 pointed
to both industry and municipal sewage treatment (or the lack thereof)
as the prime culprits in the water pollution problems facing
Cleveland, Detroit, and other Great Lakes metropolitan centers.153 Yet
these conferences repeatedly foundered on the issue of the degree of
sewage treatment needed from municipalities. The head of Detroit’s
water and sewer system was concerned that the cost entailed by
higher treatment standards would deter suburban communities from
hooking up to Detroit’s system; the massive cost of digging up
Cleveland’s antiquated combined sewer system (in which street runoff
and sanitary sewage were combined, overloading treatment facilities
during intense rain events) led to continuing local political

153. Id. at 56–65.
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opposition.154 Cities such as Detroit and Cleveland were clear that
their willingness to upgrade wastewater treatment facilities was
contingent upon the federal government coming through with the
promised subsidies.155 The stalemate was broken only when Great
Lakes governors succeeded in lobbying for a much larger federal
construction grant program to finance the construction and upgrading
of municipal sewage treatment facilities.156
These lobbying efforts succeeded in the Clean Water Restoration
Act of 1966.157 In passing that law, Congress ignored the Johnson
Administration’s river basin approach to pollution abatement—an
approach that would have tended to reduce state-level authority—and
instead vastly increased federal funding for municipal waste treatment
plants from $150 million to $450 million for fiscal year 1968, rising
steadily to $1.25 billion in fiscal year 1971.158 The Act removed the
ceilings on the federal share of individual projects and set a fiftypercent federal share for projects in states that paid twenty-five
percent and established enforceable water quality standards.159
The Vietnam War intervened, however, and federal contributions
throughout the 1960s fell short of the promised amounts, with only
$214 million of the $700 million authorized for 1969 actually
appropriated.160 By 1972, the federal government had contributed only
seven percent of New York’s Pure Waters construction program.161 At
the same time, upgrading municipal treatment facilities became
increasingly important because a larger and larger share of industrial
wastes were being discharged into municipal treatment systems. In
Milwaukee, for instance, the biological oxygen demand of the
industrial effluent sent to the city system was equal to that from a
154. Id.
155. Id. at 86.
156. Id. at 64. The boldest such “lobbying” effort was Nelson Rockefeller’s
1964 Pure Waters Program for New York state. Rockefeller proposed a
$1.7 billion sewage treatment facility construction program, which
assumed a thirty percent contribution from the federal government, a
contribution far greater than current federal law allowed. Convinced
that the problem in large urban states like New York was so severe that
the federal grant limits would eventually increase, Rockefeller
“prefinanced” the federal government’s share of projects—he used the
proceeds of state bond sales to pay for total project construction costs in
anticipation that the federal government would eventually pay its share.
Id. at 83.
157. Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246.
158. Kehoe, supra note 138, at 84–85.
159. Id. at 85.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 127.
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city of approximately 1.6 million. Since the Milwaukee system served
a population of approximately one million, the industrial load made
up well more than half of the (BOD measured) total load sent to that
city’s system.162 The vastly increased industrial load on municipal
wastewater treatment systems gave municipalities an additional
argument in seeking increased federal funding in the 1972 Clean
Water Act.
The stated goals of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972163 (FWPCA) are to obtain zero discharge of
pollutants into the nation’s waters by 1985, and as an interim goal, to
get all waters to the fishable and swimmable state by 1983.164 Like the
CAA, the FWPCA represents a stab at cooperative federalism, under
which the federal government has both standard-setting and
enforcement authority but States retain the primary role in reducing
water pollution. In the water quality area, cooperative federalism
means that each State is responsible for categorizing bodies of water
within the state. While the FWPCA itself directly authorizes pressure
from the federal EPA on States to eliminate water quality use
categories below fishable-swimmable (i.e., industrial use, or low water
quality), there are over one hundred different categories used by
States across the country. Moreover, aside from high quality
watersheds (for which there are uniform anti-degradation criteria)
there are no uniform standards for what counts as fishable-swimmable
or any other use designation.165
2. Cooperative Federalism Under the Clean Water Act:
Federal Subsidies, Local Standards

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Clean Water Act’s
“cooperative federalism” approach was the requirement (added by the
1977 Amendments) that the EPA set separate “pretreatment”
standards for industrial discharges into publicly owned treatment
works (POTW’s).166 Although the federal law clearly requires the
162. Id. at 86.
163. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
164. Id. § 101(a)(1)–(2), 86 Stat. 816.
165. Evan J. Ringquist, Environmental Protection at the State
Level: Politics and Progress in Controlling Pollution 54
(1993).
166. “Pretreatment” refers to the treatment of a pollutant by an industrial
facility prior to putting its wastewater into a public sewer system. See
40 C.F.R. § 403.3(s) (2012). The pretreatment requirements are set out
in the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–217, § 54(a), 91 Stat.
1566, 1591 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (2006)), and 40 C.F.R. §
403.3(s) (2012)).
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EPA to require industrial facilities that discharge into POTW’s to
meet a nationally uniform “best available technology” based cleanup
standard,167 the EPA took over almost ten years to promulgate its
first set of categorical pretreatment standards (industry-wide
standards for particular specified toxic pollutants).168 Moreover, the
standards are actually implemented and enforced at the local level. It
is the POTW’s themselves who have the job of permitting industries
that are discharging into their systems and monitoring permit
compliance.169 The only federal requirement for industries that
discharge into POTW’s is a semi-annual discharge report and
notification of additional loads that would interfere with the operation
of the POTW.170 Over ten years after the pretreatment program was
written into the Clean Water Act, local implementation was,
according to one prominent commentator, “in a state of chaos.”171
Most pertinently, he observed that “if the purpose of a national
discharge program were to offset the political pressures on states to
relax their programs, the pressures are even more formidable at the
local level, producing a wide variety of standards and levels of
compliance among the local municipal systems.”172 On a state
regulatory failure theory of federal environmental controls, the way
that the Clean Water Act regulates discharges into POTW’s is
indeed pathological.
To understand the delegation to localities of the implementation
of pretreatment standards, one must understand also that the main
impact of the FWPCA has not been through uniform national water
quality standards, but rather through the Municipal Wastewater
Treatment grant program. As explained above, the water pollution
problem was stalemated at the state level largely because of the
longstanding municipal practice of dumping untreated (or barely
treated, e.g. by passage through settling ponds) sewage directly into
lakes, rivers, and oceans.173 The municipal wastewater grant program
in the 1972 FWPCA broke the stalemate by providing federal funding
for seventy-five percent of the cost of constructing municipal
167. See Clean Water Act of 1977 § 53(a), 91 Stat. 1589–90 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2)); 40 C.F.R. § 401.12 (2012).
168. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA/625/10·86/005, Environmental Regulations and Technology: The National Pretreatment Program (1986).
169. Id. at 10–11. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.8(f) (2012).
170. 40 C.F.R. § 403.12(e) (2012).
171. Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America’s
Coastal Zone, 47 Md. L. Rev. 358, 384 (1988).
172. Id. at 385–86 (footnotes omitted).
173. Ringquist, supra note 165, at 54.
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wastewater treatment plants meeting the FWPCA requirement of
secondary treatment (removal of eighty-five of most pollutants and
nutrients).174 Even after Amendments to Clean Water Act in 1981
reduced the federal government’s share of the cost of new wastewater
treatment works to fifty-five percent, by 1988 the federal government
had spent somewhere between forty-five billion dollars and sixty-nine
billion dollars (between roughly $90 and $138 billion in 2014 dollars)
paying for new municipal wastewater treatment facilities.175 This
expenditure is a substantial fraction of the estimated total of $300
billion spent on water pollution control during this period.176
As a leading student of state environmental programs has
pointed out:
The municipal wastewater treatment grant program was
probably equal parts environmental policy and development
policy. Serious water quality problems were limiting the
potential growth in some municipalities, and wastewater
treatment plants removed this obstacle to growth. In addition,
every state was entitled to at least one-half of 1 percent of the
total wastewater treatment grant budget, regardless of need,
which reinforced the redistributive (some would say pork barrel)
character of the program.177

Pork barrel or not, the grant program succeeded in doubling the
number of municipal wastewater treatment plants providing
secondary treatment or better between 1977 and 1983,178 and in
decreasing the amount of wastes (measured by biological oxygen
demand) leaving such facilities by forty-six percent between 1972 and
1982.179 Between 1970 and 1985, the fraction of the U.S. population
served by wastewater treatment increased from forty-two percent to
seventy-four percent.180
Despite the centrality of the grant program to realized reductions
in point source pollution under the FWPCA, the program merits little
attention in environmental law casebooks. These texts focus instead
on the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),
174. Id. at 54. The federal subsidies are authorized by the Clean Water Act
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–217, §§ 9–54(a), 91 Stat. 1566, 1568–1591
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281–1299 (2006)).
175. See Ringquist, supra note 165, at 55, 172.
176. Id. at 172.
177. Id. at 54–55.
178. Id. at 173.
179. Id. at 174.
180. World Resources Inst., World Resources 1992–1993, at 167
tbl.11.2 (1992).
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under which industrial and municipal facilities that discharge
pollutants into navigable waters must meet technology-based effluent
standards that are uniform within a particular industry. While it is
true that industrial facilities have significantly reduced their effluent
discharge since the passage of the FWPCA, much of this
improvement has come about because industrial polluters no longer
directly discharge pollutants into waterways. Instead, since the mid1970s roughly half of all industrial polluters have discharged their
wastes into municipal wastewater treatment systems.181 Indeed, by
1990, only twenty-seven percent of industrial oxygen-demanding
wastes and thirty-nine percent of industrial suspended solids were
discharged directly into waterways.182 Thus, well over half of the
seventy-one percent decrease in industrial waste discharge loads that
occurred between 1974 and 1981183 was due simply to the diversion of
industrial wastes into municipal wastewater systems for treatment
by POTW’s.
On my theory, the FWPCA was a way for heavily industrialized
and polluted localities to reduce water pollution while shifting part of
the cost to taxpayers in less polluted places. This redistributive theory
explains these two key features of the FWPCA: the delegation of the
implementation of POTW pretreatment standards to the POTW’s
themselves, and the massive federal grants to improve such POTW’s.
Because the water pollution problem was local, and because that
problem was dealt with primarily by converting direct dischargers
into indirect dischargers to local POTW’s, it is hardly surprising that
local POTW’s set the standards that local polluters are required to
meet. Improvements in local water quality came about primarily from
the federal POTW grant program. That program was not intended to
force local municipalities to do anything. It represented instead an
overt and massive transfer of federal funds to industry and local
governments in old industrialized localities and the promise of future
funds for newer industrializing localities. It enabled older, developed
regions to cleanup local environments that had been despoiled by
decades of relatively uncontrolled growth. In newer regions that were
just entering their growth phases, it provided a significant subsidy for
what would otherwise be locally funded, and locally beneficial, public
infrastructure.
A large number of localities could expect to benefit from increased
federal POTW subsidies—indeed, only a locality that was neither
industrialized nor expected to attract new industries in the future
would have seen a net cost from the subsidies. The federal water
181. Ringquist, supra note 165, at 174.
182. Id.
183. Richard A. Smith, Richard B. Alexander & M. Gordon Wolman, WaterQuality Trends in the Nation’s Rivers, 235 Sci. 1607, 1609 (1987).
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pollution control laws—both the 1972 Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966 (which,
recall, removed the dollar ceilings on individual projects)—were thus a
form of legislative universalism: political pork benefiting virtually all
members of Congress.184 Voting on these two pieces of legislation
strikingly confirms this universalism. The 1966 Clean Water
Restoration Act was approved by a 312 to 0 vote in the House and by
90 to 0 in the Senate.185 The FWPCA of 1972 was approved 86 to 0 in
the Senate186 and by a vote of 380 to 14 in the House.187
Finally, on my theory, one ought not to be surprised by the fact
that the total amount of pollutants entering the nation’s waters from
sewage treatment plants did not decline despite massive federal
subsidies to upgrade and build new treatment works.188 The federal
program was intended to subsidize continued economic growth, and
the continued increases in municipal wastes that such growth entails.
B.

The Clean Air Act: Federal Minimum Standards as Regional
Protectionism and Local Counter-Majoritarianism

The belief that the Federal Clean Air Act of 1970 resulted from
the States’ complete inability or unwillingness to promulgate air
quality standards is today so widespread as to make citation
superfluous.189 It is in fact true that although the federal Air Quality
Act of 1967 authorized States to establish air quality standards, by
1970, no State had completed the standard-setting task.190 But it is a
huge and empirically unwarranted leap to infer a race-to-the-bottom
among the states from this administrative failure. Unwarranted first
because as already discussed, as of 1970, most states did have a
generalized air pollution problem. Up until the 1960s, by far the most
widespread and salient air pollution problem in America was smoke
from the burning of coal, and this problem had always been dealt
with by local rather than state government. Cities and counties had
demonstrated, moreover, tremendous success in dealing with the
184. Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization
of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as
Markets, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 132 (1988) (predicting that political pork
barrel is conferred in universalistic ways).
185. Kehoe, supra note 138, at 85.
186. 117 Cong. Rec. 38864–65 (1971).
187. 118 Cong. Rec. 10803–04 (1972).
188. Significant Progress on Water Pollution Reported, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12,
1984, at 31.
189. See, e.g., Gary C. Bryner, Blue Skies, Green Politics: The
Clean Air Act of 1990 and Its Implementation 98 (2d ed. 1995).
190. Id. at 98–99.
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smoke problem. Unwarranted finally because as a matter of political
economy, the federal Clean Air Act became viable simply because
local air pollution from automobiles had become a problem in a
sufficient amount of urban areas to make the problem “national” in
scope. Even more significantly, the federal Clean Air Act was
implemented only when it was amended in 1977 to include a
Prevention of Significant Deterioration requirement that reduced the
comparative advantage of less-developed, less-polluted states in
competing for new industrial plants.
After briefly overviewing the 1970 Clean Air Act, this Part
explains the simple but powerful economics driving the passage of the
kind of federal minimum standards that are at the heart of the Clean
Air Act. I then detail the story of the passage of the key minimum
standard in the Clean Air Act, the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) Standard.
1.

The 1970 Clean Air Act

As the federal courts never tire of repeating, the original, 1970
version of the Clean Air Act set out a two-stage process for federal air
pollution regulation. At the first stage, the federal EPA is required by
Section 109 to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards for six
commonly found air pollutants. These criteria pollutants are
particulate matter, ground-level ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur
oxides, nitrogen oxides, and lead. There are two types of air quality
standards. Under Section 109(b)(1), the EPA is instructed to set
primary air quality standards at levels “requisite to protect the public
health” with an “adequate margin of safety.”191 Under Section
109(b)(2), the EPA is also tasked with the job of setting secondary air
quality standards at a level that “is requisite to protect the public
welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with
the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air.” Secondary
standards must be at least as stringent as the primary standards.
Importantly, both primary and secondary NAAQs are nationally
uniform minimum ambient air quality standards.
Importantly, when Congress passed the CAA in 1970, it
understood air pollution as a “localized phenomenon that is best
handled as a state program with minimum federal involvement.”192
Unsurprisingly given this understanding, under the Clean Air Act’s
original structure, Congress delegated to the States the job of figuring
out how to reduce pollution from existing sources. States are required
to develop State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to ensure that the
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(1) (1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7
409(b)(1) (2006)).
192. Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Stationary Source Air Pollution Law
126 (2005).
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nationally uniform NAAQs are met in each air quality region within
the state.193 Regions generally cut across a number of counties, and
are supposed to correspond to airsheds (e.g., Metropolitan Los
Angeles, or the San Francisco Bay Area). State discretion in crafting
SIPs was limited by Congress; Section 110(a)(2) sets out a long list of
requirements that SIPs must contain,194 and Section 110(a)(3) requires
each state to get federal EPA approval for its SIP.195
With respect to new stationary sources of air pollution, the 1970
Clean Air Act exhibited much less trust in state regulatory authority.
The CAA instructed the federal EPA to set standards for new or
modified sources of air pollution within source categories (e.g.,
commercial-industrial steam generating units of a certain minimum
generating capacity).196 The new source performance standards
(NSPS) are to be based on the “best system of emission reduction
which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and
any non-air quality health and environmental impact and energy
requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately
demonstrated.”197 Thus with respect to new sources, the CAA
required national source-specific emission standards that were uniform
across sources in particular categories.
The other core feature of the original CAA was its regulation of
mobile sources of air pollution—primarily automobiles. Here, the basic
structure adopted by the CAA was drawn directly from the earlier
federal Air Pollution Control Act of 1967; the federal EPA sets
technology-based auto exhaust emission standards, requiring a mix of
combustion and post-combustion controls that reduce emissions of
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds and
other unburned hydrocarbons and (from diesel engines) particulate
matter.198 Under the CAA, only California was allowed to set tougher
auto emission standards than those set by the federal EPA.199 Thus,
aside from potentially even tougher standards in California, the
193. § 1857c-2(a) (1970) (current version at § 7407(a) (2006)); 40 C.F.R. § 81
(2012) (listing air quality control regions in Appendix A).
194. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (1970) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (2006) (Every SIP must include “enforceable
emission limitations and other control measures, means, or techniques
. . . as may be necessary or appropriate to meet the applicable [CAA]
requirements.”).
195. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1970) (current version at § 7410(a)(3)(B) (2006)).
196. § 1857c-6(a)(1) (1970) (current version at § 7411(a)(1) (2006)).
197. Id.
198. See Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control,
6 Envtl. Law. 309, 321–25, 338–43 (2000).
199. See Bailey, supra note 101, at 134–35; Clean Air Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95–95, § 177, 91 Stat. 680, 750 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2006)).
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CAA set nationally uniform, technology-based standards for auto
exhaust emissions.
2.

Explaining the Clean Air Act: The Simple Economics of (Locally)
Counter-Majoritarian Federal Minimum Environmental Standards

The key to demonstrating how federal environmental laws were
passed by a majority in the U.S. Congress is in recognizing that for
the most part, those laws imposed nationally uniform minimum
environmental standards. Whenever such minimum federal standards
bind, they force relatively undeveloped jurisdictions to require more
stringent environmental controls than their residents would choose
under decentralized decision-making. Inasmuch as higher levels of
environmental cleanup and control are increasingly costly on the
margin, such federal minima increase the cost to businesses of locating
in or relocating to undeveloped jurisdictions relative to what the costs
would be under decentralized regulation. On the margin, federal
minima discourage businesses from relocating to take advantage of the
cheaper labor and raw materials found in the undeveloped
jurisdiction.200 They thereby cut the economic cost of pollution
reduction—in terms of lost industries, jobs and taxes—to developed
jurisdictions. Federal minima are a form of economic protectionism,
protecting developed jurisdictions from competition by lesserdeveloped jurisdictions for mobile capital.
One can show that regardless of whether there is any actual
“federal” problem—such as spillovers across jurisdictions—the
existence of a federal legislature itself is enough to ensure majority
support for federal minimum standards. More precisely, federal
minimum standards will almost always get majoritarian support in a
federal legislature.201 Figure 1 shows why this is so. The figure depicts
the frequency distribution of voter preferences for pollution reduction
200. Pashigian, supra note 27, at 558 (“If the rents of remaining factors
specific to a location declined when factors moved as a consequence of
the cost of complying with more stringent local regulations, the owners
of the location specific factors would support federal policies that
reduced mobility. . . . By raising the cost of mobility, any improvement
in local air quality could be achieved but with a smaller reduction in the
rents of factors specific to the locality.”). While recognizing the
importance of the anticompetitive motive in PSD policy, Pashigian
failed to see that it explains many other instances of federal
environmental regulation as well.
201. See Jacques Crémer & Thomas R. Palfrey, Federal Mandates by
Popular Demand, 108 J. Pol. Econ. 905, 912 (2000) [hereinafter
Crémer & Palfrey, Popular Demand] (showing that the federal standard
would equal the average standard throughout the districts); Jacques
Crémer & Thomas R. Palfrey, Federal Mandates with Local Agenda
Setters, 7 Rev. Econ. Design 279 (2002) (developing a model that
investigates how local voters respond to federal mandates).
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in a simple three-jurisdiction world. Each voter has what are known
as Euclidean preferences, meaning that the voter’s utility from the
actual public policy outcome declines linearly with the outcome’s
distance from the voter’s ideal point. As can be seen from the Figure,
the jurisdictions can be ranked in terms of the preferences for
pollution reduction of the median voter in each: high, moderate, and
low. The respective median points—eh , em , and el—are the pollution
control standards under decentralization, that is, the standards that
would get majority voter support were a referendum held in
each jurisdiction.202

Figure 1: Majoritarian Choice of a Federal Minimum Standard
Now consider a federal referendum in which voters choose a
minimum pollution control standard for all three jurisdictions. The
federal minimum chosen in such a referendum would be em. This can
be understood by looking at each jurisdiction. The federal minimum
does not prevent the high demand jurisdiction from going ahead and
setting local mandates that are much higher, and so voters there are
relatively indifferent to the level of the federal minimum standard.
202. The median voter theorem—that majoritarian elections produce the
median voter’s preferred outcome—is truly a theorem, in that there are
a number of assumptions regarding both voter preferences and the
electoral process that must be true for the result to obtain. It does hold
in the simplified world considered by Crémer and Palfrey. See generally
Geoffrey Brennan & Loren Lomasky, Democracy & Decision:
The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference 76–81 (1993)
(discussing the limitations of the median voter theorem).
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Voters in the moderate demand jurisdiction can simply vote their
preferences, and end up with the federal minimum being set at a level
that they would have set independently. Regardless of what voters in
the low demand jurisdiction adopt as a voting strategy, they cannot
prevent em from being chosen.
Observe that this federal minimum standard binds and alters the
regulatory outcome only in the low demand jurisdiction. Observe also,
however, that for a minority of voters in the low demand jurisdiction,
the federal minimum is closer to their preferred level of environmental
cleanup than is the level el that is chosen by local residents of their
jurisdiction (in the Figure, all voters in the low demand jurisdiction
who prefer a level of pollution control at or above em are better off
with the federal minimum). Hence for the minority in the generally
low demand jurisdiction, that jurisdiction’s membership in the
federation gives them the ability to get much tougher pollution
control standards than they would be able to achieve under
local control.
This result holds even when the model is extended from standards
chosen by popular referenda to standards chosen by legislatures.203 It
predicts that the prime beneficiaries of the passage of federal laws
mandating minimum federal pollution control standards for the states
will be the strongly pro-environmental minority in states that would
otherwise not regulate so stringently. For this reason, it may be called
the “counter-majoritarian” motive for federal mandates. It is not the
developed jurisdiction majority who benefit from counter-majoritarian
federal mandates, but rather the strongly pro-environmental minority
in undeveloped jurisdictions. Because the local environment in
undeveloped jurisdictions is relatively undisturbed but wealth and
income are relatively low, it is plausible that the median voter in such
a jurisdiction does not prefer such strong pollution control and is
willing to tolerate relatively high levels of pollution in exchange for
development. In such jurisdictions, stringent environmental controls
are desired by a local minority who wish to preserve a pristine albeit
relatively poor local environment.
The anticompetitive and counter-majoritarian motives for federal
environmental cleanup mandates are complementary. What drives the
anticompetitive motive is the concern of the developed community
majority that they will lose jobs and income if they mandate locally
desired but costly pollution reduction. Costly federal pollution control
mandates prevent lesser-developed jurisdictions from benefiting from
the natural competitive advantage provided by cheap land, labor and
raw materials. What drives the counter-majoritarian motive is the
concern of a strongly pro-environmental minority in undeveloped

203. See Crémer & Palfrey, Popular Demand, supra note 201, at 908–12.
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jurisdictions that local residents prefer economic growth and
development at the expense of some environmental degradation.
As a matter of positive prediction, the anticompetitive and
counter-majoritarian models identify two groups of voters who should
support federal minimum environmental standards: the majority of
developed jurisdiction voters, and a limited but potentially intense
minority in undeveloped jurisdictions. What drives federal minima are
differing preferences for environmental cleanup. Inasmuch as they are
anticompetitive, such federal minima reflect different preferences
across jurisdictions—they enable developed jurisdiction voters to force
lesser-developed jurisdictions to adopt tougher standards than their
residents prefer. Inasmuch as they are counter-majoritarian, federal
minima reflect preference differences both across jurisdictions and
within jurisdictions. They force a higher level of environmental
cleanup than the median voter in the lesser-developed jurisdiction
wants, thereby giving residents of that jurisdiction who have a high
demand for environmental amenities something that they could not
get through the local, decentralized political process.
3. From PSD to the Rise of Technology-Based Standards
Under the Clean Air Act

The positive theory of protectionist and counter-majoritarian
federal environmental standards can be applied to explain both the
centrality of the PSD program to the passage of the CAA, and the
subsequent evolution of federal minimum standards under the CAA.
a.

The PSD Standards and the Passage of the CAA

In its original, skeletal form, the Clean Air Act could well have
been understood as based on a cooperative federalism model, which
preserved an important role for the states and allowed at least some
flexibility to the states to weigh the localized costs and benefits of
pollution reduction. As the Court said in one of its first opportunities
to interpret the CAA, “so long as the ultimate effect of a State’s
choice of emission limitations is compliance with the national
standards for ambient air, the State is at liberty to adopt whatever
mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular
situation.”204 And, in reiterating many years later that the federal
EPA may not consider the compliance cost of alternative standards in
setting NAAQs, the Court stressed it would be “impossible” for states
to design SIPs “without considering which abatement technologies are
most efficient, and most economically feasible—which is why we have
said that ‘the most important forum for consideration of claims of

204. Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).
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economic and technological infeasibility is before the state agency
formulating the implementation plan.’”205
As recounted earlier, however, when the Federal Clean Air Act
was passed in 1970, it was against a background of rapidly escalating
state and local air pollution regulation. Indeed, when the federal EPA
issued the first draft NAAQs in January 1971, environmentalists in
California, Massachusetts, and Colorado argued that the proposed
federal standards were weaker than the standards that their own
states had already adopted.206 In other states, a vocal minority
protested that the new federal air standards were not tough enough.
The complaints came from citizen and environmental groups located
in two regions in particular: the Southwestern states, where residents
were concerned about the effects on tourist demand for pristine air
from emissions at massive new proposed coal-fired power plants
located in the Four Corners region; and the heavily industrial Rust
Belt area, where the local effects of pollution from the burning of coal
were most pronounced.207 Such complaints were to be expected. From
the early 1960s, two national interest groups strongly supported the
movement for federal air pollution control.208 One group, spearheaded
by the Citizens Committee on Natural Resources, emphasized the
harm to local public health caused by air pollution in highly
developed, urban areas.209 Another group, led by the Sierra Club and
the National Wildlife Federation, was interested primarily in
protecting undeveloped natural resources from commercial
development.210 These groups were concerned not with dirty air, but
with clean air; not with cleaning up fouled airsheds in heavily
developed parts of the country, but in preventing the pollution of
clean airsheds in undeveloped parts of the country.
This preservationist goal was at the heart of evolving federal air
pollution policy from the very beginning. The Preamble to the 1967
federal Air Quality Act stated that the purpose of federal air pollution
legislation was “to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the
productive capacity of its population.”211 The very first administrative
interpretations of the 1967 Act understood federal law as requiring
205. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 470 (2001) (quoting
Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 266 (1976)).
206. Vietor, supra note 100, at 163.
207. Id. at 161–63.
208. Id. at 135–37, 197–98.
209. Id. at 135, 147.
210. Id. at 197–98.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1)
(2006)) (emphasis added).
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the prevention of “significant deterioration” (“PSD”) of air quality in
relatively pristine areas of the country.212 In public hearings across the
country, the new federal air regulators made quite clear their
interpretation that under the 1967 law, “standard setting activity by
the State is called for even if the level of air quality in the region is
better than that which the criteria would require.”213
The retention of the “protect and enhance” language in the 1970
Clean Air Act was the product of intense lobbying by national
conservation groups such as the Sierra Club, and such groups
continued to lobby the EPA to include PSD requirements in initial
proposed guidelines for the state implementation plans required by
the Act.214 Led by a coalition of coal producers and users, industry
succeeded in exerting sufficient pressure in regulatory lobbying to
prevent the inclusion of a PSD requirement in the EPA’s 1971
implementation guidelines.215
Without such a requirement, the only constraint on the ability of
relatively undeveloped Western and Southern states to compete away
industry from the Northeast and Rust Belt regions would have been
the new source review technology-based pollution standards imposed
on new sources of pollution. A SIP written by a State already in
attainment with the NAAQs could have allowed as many new sources
of pollution as it wished, provided that the NAAQs were not
exceeded. For this reason, the environmental groups filed suit soon
after the passage of the CAA, arguing in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus216
that the PSD requirements found in the 1967 federal clean air law
should also be read into the 1970 Act.
Their argument hinged entirely upon general language in Section
110(b) of the CAA (the statutory purpose section), stating a
Congressional purpose “to protect and enhance the quality of the
Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and
welfare.”217 There was no provision in the 1970 Clean Air Act saying
anything specifically about a non-deterioration policy. On a basic
principle of statutory interpretation, standing alone, a provision
setting out a general purpose of a statute mandates nothing. However,

212. See Vietor, supra note 100, at 199 (discussing National Air Pollution
Control Administration interpretation in early 1968).
213. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. Id. at 202–03.
215. Veitor, supra note 100, at 203.
216. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 2 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law. Inst.)
20,656 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff’d by an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v.
Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
217. Id. at 255 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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relying on a statement in the Senate Report (and, even worse,
testimony by HEW administrators) that SIPs must provide for nondegradation of air quality in areas already in attainment with national
air quality standards, the district court ruled that SIPs must provide
for PSD.218
The EPA immediately initiated rulemaking in 1973 to incorporate
PSD requirements into SIPs.219 This 1973 decision triggered what one
historian has called a “storm of protest from the industrial
community.”220 The coal industry in particular was outraged.
Throughout the postwar era, the coal industry had been steadily and
swiftly losing ground to oil, natural gas and nuclear energy sources
that had all enjoyed massive federal subsidies as coal languished. Just
when the energy crisis of the early 1970s had promised to finally
reverse the coal industry’s fortunes, the PSD program came along.221
Industry leaders recognized that the PSD program was not about
public health but about growth control.222 A Shell Oil vice president
commented that “I am not at all sure, . . . of some of the proponents
[of PSD]—in fact, it appears that genuine concern for our
environment is being used by others to achieve quite different
objectives.”223 A U.S. Chamber of Commerce representative forecast
that PSD would “mandate undeveloped areas [of the United States]
into eternal poverty.”224 As of the mid-1970s, if economic development
was to proceed in relatively undeveloped parts of the United States, it
would be powered by coal. And if PSD was required, economic
development in such areas would be slowed, perhaps significantly.
By 1975, the PSD issue was the central problem confronting
Congress in considering how to amend the Clean Air Act. It was of
course not the only issue. In the midst of the energy crisis and
prolonged economic recession of the 1970s, neither the automobile
manufacturers nor polluted urban areas had made any progress at all
toward achieving the emissions reductions and ambient air quality
levels required by the 1970 Clean Air Act. Still, from the point of
218. The District Court decision in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus would almost
surely have been overturned by a majority of the Supreme Court, had
the full Court actually sat on the case. However, as his old law firm had
submitted an amicus brief on behalf of industry, Justice Lewis Powell
recused himself from the case, leading to an affirmation of the lower
court by virtue of a 4–4 tie. Richard Lazarus, A Tall Tale That Happens
to Be True, Envtl. F. July–Aug. 2012, at 12, 12.
219. Fri, 412 U.S. at 541; Vietor, supra note 100, at 203–04.
220. Vietor, supra note 100, at 203.
221. Id. at 205–07.
222. Id. at 208.
223. Id. at 206–07 (internal quotation marks omitted).
224. Id. at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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view of many actors, the PSD requirement was the primary focus.
Ford Administration Interior Secretary Morton told Senator Muskie’s
oversight committee that “since coal conversion is the keystone of an
effective energy program . . . we have problems resulting from court
decisions with respect to significant air quality deterioration.”225 The
Sierra Club’s congressional testimony spoke only about the weakness
of the EPA’s proposed PSD program and the need for far tougher
standards. Perhaps most importantly, through the National League of
Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors, urban mayors and Eastern
industrial states strongly supported a strong PSD program.226 Indeed,
their brief to the Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus had
clearly and succinctly summarized the protectionist rationale
underlying the PSD program:
The health of the economies of the urban-industrial regions is
dependent upon industrial continuation and growth. It is in the
best economic interest of these regions that sources [of air
pollution] remain in them and utilize the emission
controls
necessary. . . . The requirement of no-significant deterioration
prevents rural regions from allowing lenient emission controls
that are so much less expensive that an industry will have a
financial incentive to relocate . . . [N]o significant deterioration
removes the possibility of economic coercion between competing
regions.227

Congressional representatives from older, more heavily developed
jurisdictions were more than responsive to this argument. For
instance, in defending uniform national new source performance
standards and the mandatory PSD programs under the Clean Air
Act, Senator Cooper stated that such national standards would
“eliminate a large element of ‘forum shopping’ that is possible if new
facilities are not required to meet the level of pollution control,”228
Representative Prior said, “if we do not have national standards, we
find what has happened is that States begin to bid against each other

225. Id. at 210 (quoting Implementation of the Clean Air Act—1975:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution of the S. Comm. on
Pub. Works, 94th Cong., 280 (1975) [hereinafter Implementation of the
Clean Air Act] (statement of Hon. Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of
the Interior)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
226. Id. at 212.
227. Id. at 212 (quoting Implementation of the Clean Air Act, supra note
225, at 852 (statement of Richard M. Lahn, Washington Rep. of the
Sierra Club, Accompanied by Bruce Terris)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
228. 116 Cong. Rec. 33116 (1970).
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to attract polluting industries.”229 Such statements say nothing
explicit about a regulatory race-to-the-bottom. What they do clearly
show is that Congress was well aware that federal legislation can
prevent interstate competition for economic development
opportunities.
Facing such a diverse but united constituency in favor of the PSD
requirement, industry united in proposing the polar opposite: the
complete elimination of the PSD concept from federal air pollution
law.230 In 1975, eight of the largest oil companies in the world sued to
enjoin the EPA from implementing its recently written PSD
requirements. The plaintiff corporations—all involved in mining or
developing coal and all holding vast coal reserves—presented studies
showing that PSD regulations would destroy as much as eighty-six
percent of the market for West Virginia coal,231 while “[i]n the West,
with its extensive deposits of oil shale and uranium in addition to
coal, the inhibitive effects of the regulations would be even more
severe[,] . . . rais[ing] serious concern[s] for the economic survival of
the rural areas of the Nation.”232 As Congress appeared headed toward
retaining the PSD requirement, industrial emphasis on the growthretarding consequences of PSD grew even stronger. The head of the
National Coal Association told coal operators that “no-significant
deterioration . . . has already caused the coal and electric industries
more harm than any other single interpretation of the Clean Air
Act. . . . This decision can and, no doubt, will be used to halt
development across the land.”233 By 1977, the American Mining
Congress argued against PSD on the ground that “federal regulation
of growth in this context should be confined to providing procedural
guidelines that will assist the States to arrive at rational
judgments.”234
As environmental historian Richard Vietor has perceptively
observed, by the time of the 1977 Amendments, the debate over PSD
had become an explicit debate about the appropriateness of federal
controls on economic growth and development “as if twenty years had
brought the conflict between the energy industry and

229. Id. at 19213. The argument was also made in the relevant committee
reports. See H.R. Rep No. 96-294, at 133–35 (1977); H.R. Rep. No.
91-1146, at 3 (1970).
230. VIETOR, supra note 100, at 213.
231. Id. at 215.
232. Id. at 215–16 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
233. Id. at 217 (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. Id. at 223 (quoting Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution of the S. Comm. on Pub.
Works, 95th Cong. 506 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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environmentalists full circle, once again arguing federal versus state
authority, but on a different issue—that of limiting growth rather
than of actually cleaning up the environment.”235
Congress ultimately wrote the PSD requirement into the 1977
Amendments to the Clean Air Act. Those PSD requirements are
complex, but briefly if incompletely summarized, the PSD program
prohibits major new sources of air pollution from being constructed in
areas already meeting (in attainment with) NAAQs unless they (1)
install “the best available technology” (BACT)236 to control any
criteria pollutant emitted in potentially “significant” amounts and (2)
also have results from approved computer air quality models showing
that the additional pollution will not “cause or contribute” to too
large an increase in the “baseline [ambient] concentration” of the
pollutant in that area.
This complexity directly reflects the intense regional contest over
the PSD requirements that took place within the U.S. Senate. An
amendment in the Senate that would have placed a moratorium on
the PSD program was supported by Southern conservative
Democrats, Western energy states with multiple national parks (and
therefore very severe non-deterioration requirements), and
Appalachian coal states. The amendment was opposed, successfully,
by Eastern, Central and Pacific state senators.237 A clearer division
between the interest of relatively undeveloped, rural states and older,
more heavily developed and polluted states could hardly be imagined.
This division ensured that the PSD requirement included in the 1977
Amendments were filled with loopholes (baseline levels of ambient
pollution, for example) that effectively allowed the construction of
new power plants in undeveloped regions of the country.238

235. Id. at 224.
236. Under 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006), BACT is “an emission limitation
based on the maximum degree of [pollutant] reduction . . . which the
permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs,
determines is achievable for such facility.” Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 169(3), 91 Stat. 685, 741, 42 U.S.C. §
7479(3) (2006).
237. See VIETOR, supra note 100, at 218–19 (discussing the history of an
amendment proposed by Senator Frank Moss to delay PSD for a year
pending further study). Part of the difference across regions may reflect
varying preferences for environmental quality, but Pashigian, supra note
27, at 562–70, found that there was much greater regional variation in
congressional voting on PSD policy than on auto emission policy and a
portfolio of economic issues. Since PSD policy had much stronger
regional redistribution effects, this finding is strong evidence that
regional redistribution was driving the PSD vote. Id. at 569–70.
238. VIETOR, supra note 100, at 224.
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It is tempting to see the PSD program as something that
Congressional representatives of older, industrial and heavily polluted
regions got in exchange for agreeing to legislatively do something
about their regions’ non-attainment of national air quality
standards.239 It is true that the 1977 Amendments did establish a
federal, technology-based standard for new sources of air pollution in
non-attainment areas and prohibited the states from allowing such
new source unless there were sufficient reductions in existing sources
to “offset” the addition brought by new construction.240
Still, relative to the situation that would have prevailed under
decentralized, state-level regulation, the non-attainment and PSD
programs together increased the required level of pollution control in
less-developed states with little—if any—effect on pollution control
requirements in more developed states. In its stationary source
regulatory regime, therefore, the Clean Air Act significantly lowered
the competitive cost of pollution control to older, more polluted
industrial states and constituted a form of regulatory protectionism
for those states.
b.

Did the PSD Standards Work? The Limitations of Existing
Empirical Evidence

It is not enough that a theory exists to explain the stylized facts
of federalization. It is also important to verify that the theory is
consistent with the available empirical evidence. Economists have
generated a good deal of empirical evidence about things such as the
environmental Kuznets curve. They have also spent considerable time
and effort testing the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis. The existing
empirical work does not, however, address the predictions of the
regulatory protectionism theory set out here.
On that theory, States that had the worst pollution problems
were already beginning to regulate to reduce pollution, imposing costs
on industry that were contributing to nascent industrial flight to
lesser developed, less polluted regions. The CAA, and in particular
the PSD requirements, were designed to impose regulatory
requirements on less polluted regions, requirements that were more
stringent than the regulations that those unpolluted regions would
have undertaken under decentralized regulation. If the PSD
requirements worked as my account holds and actually imposed costs
on industry that would not have been imposed without PSD
requirements, then one would expect that after PSD requirements
began to be imposed, holding all else equal, there was an observable

239. Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law,
Science and Policy 609 (7th ed. 2013).
240. Id. at 597.
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slowing of industrial migration (in the sense of new plant openings) in
relatively undeveloped, attainment areas of the United States.
Economists have not investigated this hypothesis empirically. The
hypothesis that they have investigated is the race-to-the-bottom (also
called the pollution haven) hypothesis. One such body of work has
exploited geographic variation in environmental regulatory stringency
induced by the PSD requirement and by other changes made by the
1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. As noted above, the 1977
Amendments required the adoption of BACT technologies in less
polluted attainment regions. In more polluted non-attainment areas,
the 1977 Amendments required that SIPs could allow new sources
only if they met the “lowest achievable emission rate” (LAER), which
is defined as the most stringent emissions limitation that is achieved
in practice for a given source type.241 LAER requirements are
generally more expensive, and sometimes much more expensive, than
BACT requirements. Recent empirical work has shown that holding
all else equal, the tougher LAER antipollution requirements imposed
on new sources in non-attainment areas deter firms from opening new
plants there, so that plant growth is higher in cleaner, attainment
areas than in non-attainment areas.242
This work confirms not only that environmental regulations do
matter to firms in deciding where to locate their plants, but also that
they are not the only thing that matters, that other geographic
characteristics, such as the availability of cheap inputs to the
production process, also impact plant location.243 Thus, this
241. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 172, 91 Stat.
685, 746–747, 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(2) (2006).
242. See Randy A. Becker & Vernon Henderson, Effects of Air Quality
Regulations on Polluting Industries, 108 J. POL. ECON. 379 (2000);
Michael Greenstone, The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on
Industrial Activity: Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments and the Census of Manufactures, 110 J. POL. ECON. 1175
(2002); Matthew E. Kahn & Erin T. Mansur, Do Local Energy Prices
and Regulation Affect the Geographic Concentration of Employment?,
101 J. PUB. ECON. 105 (2013). More recent evidence using plant-level
census data reveals a reason for these firm decisions about plant
location—tougher air pollution regulations in non-attainment areas
significantly reduce plant-level productivity. Michael Greenstone et al.,
The Effects of Environmental Regulation on the Competitiveness of U.S.
Manufacturing, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
18392, 2012). At the county level, however, the impact of tough
environmental standards is likely to be less (in terms of lost plant
openings) when the county has abundant labor (high unemployment) or
significant industrial concentration (with attendant agglomeration
economies). Daniel L. Millimet & John A. List, The Case of Missing
Pollution Haven Hypothesis, 26 J. Regulatory Econ. 239, 241 (2004).
243. Millimet, supra note 11, at 1693 (summarizing the state of this
literature: “second generation studies—utilizing better data to identify
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presumption of my theory seems confirmed by existing evidence. As
discussed above (and also briefly below), states retain the authority to
enact tougher air pollution standards than the federal minima, and
also are responsible for permitting, monitoring and enforcing against
particular sources of air pollution. There is evidence that some states
have indeed regulated more stringently (in both standard-setting and
enforcement), than is federally required.244 Even more to the point,
there is evidence that states react strategically to the regulatory
requirements of other states by toughening their requirements after
adjacent states toughen their own regulations.245
Thus while there is no study that attempts something like a
before and after study of the PSD requirements, there is evidence that
plant location choice is strongly influenced by environmental
regulatory stringency, and that states are willing to impose tougher
environmental regulatory requirements despite the potential cost in
terms of reduced new plant openings within their borders. Both of
these are important stylized facts in my account of American
environmental federalization.
c.

The Continuing Rise of Technology-Based Standards in the Clean
Air Act of 1990

On my account, the courts and the EPA were correct—as
Congress confirmed with the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments—to
think that the 1970 CAA would never have been passed were it not
understood that new sources even in attainment areas would be
required to meet uniform technologically-based emission standards.
The 1977 Amendments not only required major sources in attainment
areas to install best available control technology (“BACT”)—the PSD
program—but also required the use of LAER technologies and
the causal effect of environmental policy—have consistently documented
a meaningful effect of environmental stringency on the location of
economic activity. That said, the findings must be interpreted
carefully. . . . [f]or the vast majority of industries, environmental costs
are a small fraction of overall costs and location decisions are dominated
by other factors.” As Millimet further cautions, in econometric studies of
the impact of environmental regulatory stringency on industrial
location, “other important determinants of the location of economic
activity are not held fixed such as a location’s endowment of physical
and human capital.”
244. See, e.g., Matthew Potoski, Clean Air Federalism: Do States Race to
the Bottom?, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 335 (2001) (concluding that states
often “exceed federal EPA standards”).
245. See Per G. Fredriksson & Daniel L. Millimet, Strategic Interaction and
the Determinants of Environmental Policy Across U.S. States, 51 J.
URBAN ECON. 101 (2002); David M. Konisky, Regulatory Competition
and Environmental Enforcement: Is There a Race to the Bottom?, 51
AM. J. POL. SCI. 853 (2007).
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emission offsetting for major sources in non-attainment areas.
Inasmuch as many heavily polluted states were already about to
require as tough or even tougher emission control standards, the CAA
as amended in 1977—the version that actually began to be enforced—
amounted to a regime of uniform minimum standards for cleaner
attainment areas of the country and a regime of potentially maximum
standards for dirtier non-attainment areas.246
This is as my theory would predict. However, after the 1977
Amendments, the CAA was left in an internally inconsistent form. On
the one hand, as environmental groups championed, the federal Clean
Air Act of 1970 “marked a significant departure from prior
approaches” by setting up NAAQs.247 And for new sources of air
pollution, the law also required nationally uniform technology-based
emission controls that were specific to particular industrial source
categories (and attainment versus non-attainment regions). However,
the CAA of 1970 also ostensibly allowed states great leeway in
deciding how to meet the NAAQs. Under the CAA’s version of
cooperative federalism, states were apparently to be trusted to figure
out ways to reduce pollution from existing sources, but were not to be
entirely trusted to set pollution control standards for new plants.
From 1977 through 1990, States containing many of the older and
more polluted areas of the country repeatedly missed statutory
deadlines for meeting the NAAQs and in many areas of the country
that had been in attainment with national standards, air quality
actually worsened. The 1990 Amendments responded to the perceived
problem of continuing non-attainment in two rather inconsistent
ways. On the one hand, Congress essentially gave up on the goal of
nationwide uniformity by creating up to six different categories of
nonattainment areas for ozone, with different statutory compliance
deadlines for each category.248 On the other hand, the 1990
Amendments required for the first time that all major sources249 of air
246. States that want to incur the costs of more stringent regulation are free
to do so. In practice, however, once the Federal EPA has said that a
certain ambient level of pollution is “allowing an adequate margin of
safety, . . . requisite to protect the public health,” the case for an even
stricter standard disappears. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-604, § 109(b)(1), 84 Stat. 1676, 1680 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
7409(b)(1) (2006)).
247. Percival et al., supra note 239, at 527–28.
248. In the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress finally gave up
on the goal of nationwide air quality attainment, and created six
different categories of nonattainment for ozone, three for carbon
monoxide, and two for particulates, with compliance deadlines that vary
by category. See 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1970,
§§ 171–78.
249. Major sources are defined as sources that emit or have the potential to
emit one hundred tons or more per year of any pollutant, ten tons or
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pollution must obtain a federal operating permit.250 Under the
Amendments, major sources were forbidden to operate without
applying for and obtaining these federal operating permits.251
Environmentalists reacted with outrage to the abandonment of
nationally uniform schedules for states to come into attainment with
the NAAQs, viewing this as a political concession that was completely
inconsistent with the principles underlying the Clean Air Act.252 But
as the statutory structure of the CAA itself clearly shows, that law
was never intended by Congress to make any part of the federal
government a credible enforcer of state efforts to meet the NAAQs.
The Clean Air Act says that the federal EPA must impose one of two
sanctions on any State that has failed to submit an adequate SIP:
either the loss of federal highway funds, or the imposition of tougher
standards for new polluting industries.253 However, at the same time,
Congress specified that EPA cannot take away highway funding in
“attainment” airsheds, and that even within dirtier, “nonattainment”
areas, federal highway funds remain available for projects that
“resolve a demonstrated safety problem and likely will result in
significant reduction in, or avoidance of, accidents.”254 Even after
Congress gave them more time in the 1990 Amendments, very few
States in fact met the November 1994 deadline for submitting revised
SIP’s for serious, severe or extreme ozone non-attainment areas,255 and
more per year of any hazardous air pollutant (“HAP”) or twenty-five
tons or more per year of any combination of HAPs. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j).
250. Id. § 7661.
251. Id. § 7661a(a).
252. See Action Needed to Force States to Comply with Clean Air Act
Amendments, Groups Say, 25 Envtl. Rep. 1373, 1373 (1994)
(discussing criticism of efforts to regulate air quality).
253. I use “adequacy” as a summary for the various findings that have to be
made by EPA under Sections 179(a)(1)–(4) of the Act before a
“deficiency” in an SIP is declared. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a)(1)–(4). The
State then has eighteen months to correct the problem with its plan. If
it fails to do so, Sections 179(b)(1)–(2) 42 U.S.C. Sections 7509(b)(1)–
(2) then require EPA to assess sanctions. The “tougher standards” I
refer to are an increase in the offset requirement for new stationary
sources within non-attainment areas, which means that new sources of
air pollution cannot be built unless they somehow obtain a 2/1
reduction in the total area emissions of a specified pollutant. Within two
years of finding that a State has failed to submit an adequate SIP,
Section 110(c)(1) of the CAA requires EPA to prepare a federal
implementation plan for the State.
254. Clean Air Act § 179(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(A). See Virginia
v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding constitutionality of
sanctioning scheme under Tenth Amendment).
255. Action Needed to Force States to Comply, supra note 252.
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yet the EPA failed to levy sanctions against any State. Indeed, in the
forty-plus year history of the Clean Air Act, the EPA has never
sanctioned a State by freezing its federal highway funding in nonattainment areas.256
On my theory, the failure of any state to ever be federally
sanctioned for failing to attain the NAAQs is hardly surprising. If the
purpose of federalization is to lessen the competitive advantage of
less-developed, less-polluted regions, then it can hardly be the older,
more polluted regions—the primary beneficiaries of federalization—
who actually face serious penalties for failing to drastically reduce
pollution by slowing development and imposing costly, industryunfriendly emission reduction requirements. An extension of deadlines
and (de facto) relaxation of pollution reduction requirements for older,
heavily polluted regions is exactly what on my theory one
would predict.
The Title V major source-permitting program created by the 1990
Amendments is on my theory also precisely what one would predict.
Such federal permits have turned out to provide an important
(though by no means exclusive) avenue by which the federal EPA has
eliminated state discretion in favor of nationally uniform, technologybased standards. This is not because states have formally been
divested of their traditional roles under the CAA. It is state, not
federal, regulators who actually decide how to implement the
nationally uniform technology-based standards by writing them into
individual, source-specific permits.257 State regulators are responsible
for inspections and monitoring to ensure that sources are in
compliance with such permits, and state regulators are the primary
enforcers against permit violations.258
Notwithstanding this continuing state role, Title V permits have
been a way for the Federal EPA to assert more and more direct
authority over the pollution abatement steps that individual plants
must take under the CAA. One method by which the EPA has
asserted such control is by promulgating technology-based standards
at a finer and finer grained level of applicability.259 For example:
256. Indeed, the decision in Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 167 F.3d
641 (D.C. Cir. 1999), was considered earth-shattering, for there the
Court found that when Congress amended the CAA in 1990 to require
that transportation planning in non-attainment areas be in conformity
with the SIP requirements for such areas, it also required EPA to deny
highway funding to any area which was currently not in attainment
under its plan.
257. REITZE JR., supra note 192, at 64, 229–31.
258. Id. at 237–39; see also id. at 125 n.1330 (“Most of the effort to enforce
[the CAA] is at the state level.”).
259. Eric L. Hiser, Air Quality Permitting: An Increasingly Limited Tool for
a Sustainable Future, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 761, 774 (2011).
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[T]he Gas Distribution Facility MACT standard applies to
anyone who stores gasoline in a stationary container, and the
Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engine (“RICE”) MACT
standard applies to almost all stationary internal combustion
engines regardless of size, which potentially captures someone
who purchases an emergency generator at Home Depot or
Lowe’s and chains it in place.260

The other (and among state regulators, notorious) way that the
federal EPA has used the permitting process as a way to directly
regulate is by overriding permitting decisions. It might seem that
Congress precluded such a federal regulatory role. For example, the
§ 169(3) BACT standard for major new sources in attainment areas
subject to the PSD program is to be determined by the “permitting
authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy,
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs.”261 A state
agency, not the federal EPA, is the “permitting authority” responsible
for making BACT determinations.262 As the statute expressly states
that this BACT determination is to be made on a “case by case” basis
involving the considering of both environmental as well as economic
“impacts and costs,” it would seem that States do indeed retain an
important role, even in a regime of technology-based standards.
However, the CAA also says that the federal EPA may “take such
measures, including issuance of an order, or seeking injunctive relief,
as necessary to prevent the construction or modification of a major
emitting facility which does not conform to [PSD] requirements.”263
The federal EPA has interpreted this provision as giving it the
authority to reject source-specific BACT determinations made by
state permitting agencies, and in Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation v. EPA,264 (ADEC) the Supreme
Court agreed.
That case involved a PSD permit for the Red Dog zinc mine,
located about one hundred miles north of the Arctic circle, near the
native villages of Kivalina and Noatak.265 The area is relatively
pristine and therefore subject to PSD requirements. From 1988 until
1996, the Red Dog Mine got its power from six diesel-powered 5000260. Id. (footnotes omitted).
261. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006).
262. See REITZE JR., supra note 192, at 81–82 (outlining the requirements
states need to meet for “severe areas” and “extreme areas”).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (2006).
264. 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
265. This description of the facts is drawn from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
in the case. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 298 F.3d 814
(9th Cir. 2002), aff’d 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
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watt generators.266 In order to expand production in 1998, the mine
agreed with the Alaska Department of Environment and Conservation
that it would install a relatively inexpensive high combustion
technology to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions on all six of its existing
generators, including those that were not major sources, plus on a
new seventh generator it needed to expand production. ADEC had
originally proposed a more expensive catalytic reduction technology
for the two generators that were subject to BACT requirements, but
it accepted Red Dog’s proposal because (assuming that under typical
operating conditions, one or more generators would be in stand-by
mode, and not operating) installing the high combustion technology
on all its generators would achieve the same reduction in nitrogen
oxide emissions as ADEC’s catalytic reduction proposal but at lower
cost.267
At this point, the federal EPA intervened, arguing that the
catalytic reduction technology was BACT for the two generators that
were increasing output, and that “the PSD program does not allow
the imposition of a limit that is less stringent than BACT even if the
equivalent emission reductions are obtained by imposing new controls
on other emission units.” The ADEC fought back, issuing a permit for
Red Dog’s expansion finding that catalytic reduction was not
economically feasible and that low NOX (the high combustion
alternative) was preferred. The EPA responded that the mine owners
had failed to show why catalytic reduction was infeasible. Eventually,
after further resistance by ADEC, the federal EPA made a formal
finding that ADEC’s authorization of Cominco’s construction and
installation of new equipment was not in compliance with PSD
requirements under the Clean Air Act and issued an order to Red
Dog’s owners preventing the company from beginning construction of
the new generator until it had demonstrated to the EPA’s satisfaction
compliance with the Act and the SIP.
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court sided with the
EPA. Most significantly, the Court accepted the EPA’s argument
that the BACT statutory definition includes an unstated limitation
that state air permitting authorities only have the “authority to make
reasonable BACT determinations”268 and that to “restrain the
interjurisdictional pressures to which Congress was alert” the federal
EPA must exercise “surveillance of a State’s BACT designation.”269
The Court approved the EPA’s reference to the explanation given in

266. Id. at 816.
267. Id. at 816–17.
268. Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 485 (citation omitted) (internal quotations
omitted).
269. Id. at 486.
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a House Report accompanying the 1977 CAA Amendments that
Federal PSD standards and federal EPA “surveillance” were necessary
so that a “State deciding to protect its clean air resources” would not
have to face the threat that it “would lose existing industrial plants to
more permissive States . . . . [and] become the target of ‘economicenvironmental blackmail’ from new industrial plants that will play
one State off against another with threats to locate in whichever State
adopts the most permissive pollution controls.”270
As the dissenting justices in ADEC observed, accepting EPA’s
argument that “state agencies are not to be trusted” lest they engage
in a “‘race to the bottom,’ where jurisdictions compete with each
other to lower environmental standards to attract new industries and
keep existing industries within their borders” flew in the face of CAA
language clearly giving States the “exclusive role in making BACT
determinations.”271 According to the dissenting justices, “Congress
made the overriding judgment that States are more responsive to
local conditions and can strike the right balance between preserving
environmental quality and advancing competing objectives.”272
Moreover, the dissent argued, the Congressional decision to leave
“certain functions to the States” so that “they would have a stake in
implementing the environmental objectives of the [CAA]” had been
borne out by the “real-world experience” that the states had, “by and
large, take[n] their statutory responsibility seriously.”273
The economics of fiscal federalism supplies a very strong
justification for the dissenting justices’ argument in ADEC. If one
assumes that state regulators are in the best position to evaluate the
actual benefits of pollution reduction in a particular location, then it
is those regulators who can best balance costs and benefits of
alternative pollution reduction techniques proposed by a local
polluting firm. During the period roughly between 1994 and 2008,
environmental “regulatory reform” meant in large part giving state
regulators greater discretion to make just such place-specific
judgments. The Alaska regulators’ decision at the Red Dog mine in
ADEC—to allow the firm to adopt the cheaper high combustion
technique at all seven generators, rather than the much more
expensive catalytic reduction technique at just two generators—
exemplified the kind of “win-win” solution that decentralization could
find. It was the practical realization of fiscal federalism’s matching
principle.

270. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep No. 96-294, at 134 (1977)).
271. Id. at 506–07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 507.
273. Id.
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As a matter of statutory interpretation, of identifying
Congressional intent in passing (and amending) the Clean Air Act, it
was the majority and not the dissenters who were correct in ADEC v.
EPA. As argued above, the congressional majority behind the CAA
wanted to cushion the anticompetitive impact on older, more
developed states of requiring costly pollution reduction. The PSD
requirements were in the CAA to stop state regulators in less
developed attainment regions from allowing rapid industrialization at
the expense of older industrial areas, regardless of whether or not the
environmental costs of new industry in attainment regions were
greatly outweighed by other benefits (or vice versa). The movement
toward a more comprehensive system of nationally uniform
technology-based emission standards, to be accomplished via the new
Title V major permit requirement, was likewise a response to the fact
that despite PSD requirements, attainment regions had been growing
more rapidly than the more heavily developed, non-attainment
regions. However much one might decry the loss of state autonomy
and economic efficiency represented by the ADEC v. EPA decision,
one must admit that a Congress that federalized environmental air
pollution regulation to provide economic protectionism would have
wanted precisely that result.

IV. The Failure of Federalization:
Climate Change as a Case Study
If my theory of environmental federalization is indeed capturing
something important about that process, then it should also explain
instances where environmental regulatory federalization has failed.
Perhaps the most striking failure of federalization has been the lack of
success in passing federal climate change legislation. Since the year
2000, at least three comprehensive climate change bills have been
introduced in the U.S. Congress. The McCain-Lieberman Climate
Stewardship Act,274 introduced in the Senate in both 2003 and 2005,
failed 59–37, with ten Democrats voting against it.275 In 2007, the
Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act of 2007276 (introduced by
Senators Boxer of California and Sanders of Vermont) died in
committee.277 And in 2009, the American Clean Energy Security

274. S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005).
275. Id.
276. S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007).
277. Id.
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(ACES) Act of 2009278 was approved by the House by a close 219–212
vote but then died in the Senate.279
The theory set out above readily explains Congressional failure to
pass climate change legislation. Recall first that circa 1970, Americans
living in heavily industrialized areas across the country were
confronted with precisely the same problem: rivers and airsheds that
were heavily polluted by industry and the automobile. This pollution
problem was not episodic—around for a few days and then gone—but
a continuing presence that was limiting both recreational use of local
resources and also further local industrial development.
Even assuming an anthropogenic contribution to climate change,
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have not yet generated
anything like the polluted air and waterways that confronted
industrial America circa 1970. Heat waves, droughts, tornadoes, and
hurricanes are said by some politicians (and even some scientists)280 to
be a result of climate change. But not only are these pronouncements
highly contested—with the majority of climate scientists at most
willing to say that some extreme weather events may have become
more likely as a result of anthropogenic climate change,281 while no
individual weather episode can be said to be “caused” by climate
change—there is quite literally nothing that can be done now to
278. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
279. See Greg G. Hitt & Stephan Power, House Passes Climate Bill, Wall
St. J., June 27–28, 2009, at A1.
280. See, for example, a recent Huffington Post story in which Rutgers
University scientist Jennifer Francis states that super storms such as
Sandy are what would be expected if greenhouse gases continue to
accumulate,
http://huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/11/hurricane-sandyarctic-ice-climate-change n 2853220.html; see also Sam Eaton, Climate
Change and Sandy, PBS NOVA (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/nova/earth/climate-change-sandy.html (reporting that “many”
climate scientists believed that “climate change may well have played an
important role in the destruction caused by Sandy a well as other recent
extreme weather events”).
281. This may well be an overstatement of the kind of causal attribution
statements climate scientists are willing to make. A more accurate
description of what most climate scientists seem to be saying is “we
don’t know.” See, e.g., Kenneth E. Kunkel et al., Monitoring and
Understanding Trends in Extreme Storms, 94 Bull. Am.
Meteorological Soc’y 499, 507 (April 2013) (a literature survey with
twenty-five climate scientist coauthors concluded that “robust detection
of trends in Atlantic and western North Pacific TC [tropical cyclone]
activity is significantly constrained by data heterogeneity and deficient
quantification of internal variability. Attribution of past TC changes is
further challenged by a lack of consensus on the physical linkages
between climate forcing and TC activity. As a result, attribution of any
observed trends in TC activity in these basins to anthropogenic forcing
remains controversial”).
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generate a short-term reduction in either the frequency or severity of
such extreme but short-lived weather events. Contemporaneous
weather events are taken by advocates of greenhouse gas reduction
policies to show that climate change is real and to support the
argument that in order to protect future generations from even worse
such events, the United States should pass legislation to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. The argument in favor of such legislation
has not been that it will generate concrete climate benefits in the near
term.
The fact that a sizeable number of members of Congress have
voted in favor of one or more of the climate change bills mentioned
above suggests that there must be some perceived benefits to at least
some states and congressional districts from such legislation. One such
benefit is the satisfaction of an ideological preference for action on
climate change. A recent econometric study has in fact shown that
congressional ideology—liberal versus conservative on a broad
measure of voting on environmental issues—is indeed a statistically
significant predictor of congressional voting on the 2009 ACES Act.282
Ideology, especially environmental ideology, is now highly correlated
with political party affiliation. Voting on climate change legislation
has thus become a political party “brand name” signal. Back in the
early 1970s, environmental federalization enjoyed broad bi-partisan
support; environmental regulation had not become an ideological
issue. By 2000, however, environmental regulation was a highly
ideological and polarizing issue, with the Republican “brand”
associated with opposition to costly new environmental regulation and
Democrats supporting such initiatives. Moreover, even within the set
of environmental regulatory issues, climate change is perhaps the
most ideologically polarizing.283 Thus while Democrats perceive a huge
benefit, if not a political obligation, to vote in favor of climate change
federalization, Republicans have precisely the opposite preference.
It is not just the ideological polarization of the climate change
issue that has caused the failure to enact a federal climate change law.
The non-ideological benefits of costly action to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions vary dramatically across states and Congressional districts.
Whereas virtually every industrialized locality benefited in 1970 from
reducing air and water pollution, many states would incur huge net
costs were a federal law to limit and impose costs and carbon dioxide
emissions. As of 2002, for example, in Wyoming and West Virginia,
well over ninety-five percent of the electric power generated in each
282. Michael I. Cragg et al., Carbon Geography: The Political Economy of
Congressional Support for Legislation Intended to Mitigate Greenhouse
Gas Production, 51 ECON. INQUIRY 1640 (2012).
283. Dan Kahan, Why We Are Poles Apart on Climate Change, 488
NATURE, Aug. 16, 2012, at 255.
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state came from coal-fired generating units.284 For another eighteen
states, over half of the electric power generated in the state came
from burning coal.285 A federal law taxing or limiting generation of
electric power from burning coal has the effect of disproportionately
increasing the costs of locating a manufacturing plant in states that
are so heavily reliant on coal. Conversely, as of 2002, there were nine
states in which coal-burning electric utility generating facilities
provided less than twenty-five percent of the power generated within
the state.286 For such states, a federal law taxing or limiting carbon
dioxide emissions would have relatively little impact on the electric
power costs of industries within such states, improving the
competitive position of such states in keeping and attracting industry.
And this is just the power industry. When one considers industries
that directly emit carbon dioxide—such as cement and steel—the
impact of any federal law attaching costs to carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gas emissions would have an enormous impact on the
relative competitiveness of different states.
What has doomed federal climate change legislation is the fact
that whether a state can expect to win or lose from federal legislation
imposing costs on carbon dioxide emissions is highly correlated with
the ideology and political party of that state’s Congressional
representatives, and party happens to be highly correlated with
whether a state would be net short term winner or loser from
imposing costs on carbon dioxide emissions. Ideological conservatives
on environmental issues are overwhelmingly Republican,287 and such
environmentally conservative legislators overwhelmingly come from
states that would be big net losers from a federal law imposing costs
on carbon dioxide emissions. More precisely, Republican congressional
representatives come primarily from the South and Midwest, which
are exactly the regions that can expect to be big short-term losers
from climate change legislation. Moreover, the states that have
nothing much to lose from imposing costs on carbon dioxide emissions
are in a distinct minority among states. Those states—the net shortterm winners from federal climate change legislation—are those that
are unusually reliant on hydropower (Oregon, Washington, and
California) or nuclear power (New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
284. 2001–2012 Net Generation by State by Type of Producer by Energy
Source, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., www.eia.gov/electricity/data/
state (follow link to download “XLS” spreadsheet) [hereinafter U.S.
EIA].
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Jon P. Nelson, “Green” Voting and Ideology: LCV Scores and Roll-Call
Voting in the U.S. Senate, 1988–1998, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 518
(2002).
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and Vermont).288 Over the period since 2000, there have been some
instances when a senator’s political party affiliation or ideology does
not line up with a state’s interest in a law imposing costs on carbon
dioxide emissions—for example, in 2003, when both Republican
Senator Lugar and Democrat Senator Bayh from Indiana (a likely net
loser from carbon dioxide taxes or fees) voted in favor of federal
climate change legislation.289 But those have been the exception and
not the rule.
The contrast between climate change circa 2014 and air and water
pollution circa 1970 is stark. Federal legislation setting mandatory
minimum standards for emissions of air pollutants brought very
concrete and immediate environmental benefits to virtually every
industrialized area of the country and at the same time lessened the
competitive advantage of lesser-developed places. Federal water
pollution legislation actually subsidized water pollution reduction in
such industrialized areas. Federal climate change legislation would
generate very large, anti-competitive cost increases for regions of the
country constituting a majority in the U.S. Senate while generating
no discernible short-term climate benefits anywhere. Indeed, according
to the Environmental Protection Agency, the only short-term
environmental benefit from reducing greenhouse gas emissions would
be indirect, in the form of a reduction in conventional air pollutants
(primarily fine particulates).290 Given that a majority of states would
be net losers were costs imposed on carbon dioxide emissions, it is
hardly surprising that the minority of states that would enjoy a
competitive advantage from such cost imposition have failed to pass
federal climate change legislation. On my theory, this failure is
precisely what one ought to have predicted.

288. For data over the entire 2001–2012 period, see U.S. EIA, supra note 284.
Note that it is precisely such states where both Senators, from the same
party, have voted in favor of climate change federalization. For example,
the states with both Senators voting in favor of the 2003 McCainLieberman climate change bill were California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, and Washington.
289. See 108 CONG. REC. 26, 583 (2003).
290. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June
18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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